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Abstract 
 
Transfusion is an important field of clinical medicine, responsible for saving the lives of 
millions of people. However, concerns remain for patients’ safety from adverse reactions 
and transfusion transmissible infections (TTIs). While risks from well-known TTIs (such as 
human immunodeficiency virus, human T-lymphotrophic virus, hepatitis B virus, hepatitis C 
virus and Treponema pallidum) have been reduced in developed nations, developing 
countries struggle to maintain the minimum screening requirements for these infections. 
Introduction of stringent donor questionnaires and sensitive screening tests are strategies 
to minimise risk, however, there is a threat to the safety of the blood supply from emerging 
infectious diseases.  
 
In 2005, the global annual disease burden for hepatitis E virus (HEV) was estimated to be 
20.1 million incident infections, which resulted in an estimate of 3.3 million symptomatic 
cases, 70,000 deaths and 3,000 still births. This study represented 71% of world’s 
population and was associated with genotype 1 and 2. An improved epidemiological 
understanding of autochthonous HEV through the adoption of improved tests and testing 
practices, together with evidence of the virus in blood donors and cases of transfusion 
transmitted HEV (TT-HEV), have raised concern for transfusion safety. Increasing HEV 
awareness in recent years in Australia, and limited prevalence and incidence data in the 
blood donor population, warranted investigation of the risk posed by this virus to the 
Australian blood supply. This study therefore aimed to evaluate HEV risk to blood safety. 
 
Firstly, this study provided evidence that 5.99% of Australian blood donors had been 
exposed to HEV. HEV IgG was detected in international travellers (6.38%) and non-
travellers (3.37%), indicating the possibility of both imported and locally-acquired HEV in 
Australia. The study also demonstrated prior HEV exposure was higher in donors with 
prior donation restrictions in relation to malaria and/or diarrhoea. This suggests the current 
blood donor management strategy in Australia in relation to malaria and diarrhoea are 
partially effective in minimizing risk of TT-HEV.  
 
The rate of HEV RNA positivity among 14,799 blood donations was then assessed, with 
one donation testing positive. The risk of collecting an HEV infectious donation was 
estimated to be 1 in 14,799 donations (95% CI: 1 in 2,657 to 1 in 584,530). The one HEV 
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positive sample was HEV genotype 3, which suggests either the donor was infected 
overseas in a developed country where this genotype occurs, or within Australia via 
zoonotic transmission. The viral load in the HEV RNA positive sample was estimated to be 
15,000 IU/ml. Viral loads between 400 and 250,000 IU/mL have been associated with TT-
HEV in the United Kingdom, however, as this study was de-linked, risk of transfusion 
transmissibility from this donation was unable to be determined. 
 
In addition, countries at higher risk for travel related HEV exposure were identified through 
a retrospective study of notified HEV cases in Australia. This analysis allowed an 
assessment of whether the current travel based considerations used by the Australian Red 
Cross Blood Service adequately manage this risk. This study demonstrated that the 
majority of notified overseas-acquired HEV infections in Australia were in travellers 
returning from South Asia, namely India, Bangladesh and Nepal. These countries are 
endemic for HEV as large water-borne outbreaks occur sporadically. The majority of these 
countries are also endemic for malaria. This study estimated that countries for which blood 
donations are restricted following travel due to malaria-risk accounted for 94%of overseas-
acquired HEV cases in Australia. 
 
HEV prevalence was also measured in Nepal, a developing nation endemic for HEV, 
allowing for a comparison between an endemic and presumed non-endemic country 
(Australia). This study measured HEV IgG prevalence of 41.90% in Nepalese blood 
donors. Current and recent HEV infection occurred in Nepalese donors, based on 0.11% 
and 2.98% of donors having HEV antigen and HEV IgM, respectively. Though the water-
borne mode of HEV transmission is common in Nepal, this study suggests other modes of 
transmission including zoonotic transmission may occur in Nepal. HEV infection results in 
a relatively high mortality rate in pregnant women and can cause chronic infection in 
immunocompromised individuals. Hence a safe blood supply for these risk groups should 
also be of concern in developing countries. Priorities for safe blood transfusion vary 
between Australia and Nepal, based on how common infectious agents are in these 
countries, as well as the maturity of blood transfusion services, and the cost-effectiveness 
of screening. 
 
This research has provided an evidence based assessment of the risk HEV currently 
poses to the safety of the blood supply in Australia. The research findings from this study 
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will be utilised to develop strategies for managing blood transfusion safety and form the 
basis of policies to manage the potential threat of TT-HEV. Prevalence and incidence data 
are also of importance to public health authorities to supplement existing data sets to 
assist with assessing the current burden of HEV infection in Australia. 
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Introduction 
 
Transfusion medicine has evolved as a discipline that focuses on the use of blood, blood 
components and products (1). Blood transfusion is required for patients with various 
medical conditions such as cancer, blood diseases, anaemia, surgery, orthopaedic, 
obstetrics and trauma. In Australia, ~34% of all red blood cell transfusions are for 
haematological and oncological conditions, and ~4% are used for obstetric and 
gynaecological patients (2). The lifesaving process of transfusion, is however, challenged 
with adverse reactions (such as acute haemolytic reactions or allergic reactions) following 
transfusion and transfusion transmissible infections (TTIs) (3). 
 
Introduction of stringent blood donor selection, sensitive screening assays and pathogen 
inactivation methods have reduced the threat from TTIs (4). However, there remains risk 
with the failure in quality management systems and also with the emergence of new 
pathogens that have adapted to the changing environment. Immigration and travel to 
disease endemic countries has exposed populations to new diseases. Emerging 
pathogens representing a potential threat to blood safety include West Nile virus (WNV), 
dengue virus (DENV), Zika virus (ZIKV), Babesia spp., hepatitis E virus (HEV), human 
herpes virus-8 (HHV-8), Trypanosoma cruzi and prions (causing variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob 
Disease (vCJD)) (5-7). Re-emerging variants of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 
hepatitis B virus (HBV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV) (5), may also pose a threat to a safe 
blood supply. The risk of these infections to blood safety needs to be assessed separately 
for each disease, based on the myriad of disease-specific parameters. Depending on the 
risk, additional blood screening tests or new donation restriction policies may be warranted 
in the future. 
 
Australia’s blood supply is among safest in the world (8). Besides screening for well- 
known TTIs (HIV, HCV, HBV, Treponema pallidum), additional screening for exposure to 
Plasmodium spp. in donors returning from malaria endemic countries (9), and 
cytomegalovirus (CMV) for specific recipients (10), ensures safety for transfusion 
recipients. Regular dengue outbreaks in northern Queensland highlights the possible 
threat from emerging infectious diseases to the Australian blood supply (11). 
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The emergence of HEV in developed countries has gained global public health importance 
(12). The high rate of asymptomatic HEV infection, evidence of transfusion transmission 
and chronic hepatitis in immunocompromised individuals, has raised concern for the 
international blood transfusion community (13, 14). In Australia, hepatitis E is a nationally 
notifiable disease (15). However, the true incidence of the disease is not known due to its 
frequent subclinical infection and the limited published data. In addition, hepatitis E seems 
to be underdiagnosed as HEV testing was not recommended in non-travellers with acute 
hepatitis, as it was not thought to be a zoonosis in Australia. Reports of transfusion 
transmitted HEV (TT-HEV) have highlighted the risk of this virus to transfusion safety (16-
18). Despite current management strategies at the Australian Red Cross Blood Service 
(Blood Service) to safeguard against TTIs, HEV may still pose a risk to the Australian 
blood supply if transmission increase in Australia, if unknowingly infected donors return 
from overseas, or if there is an increase in locally-acquired HEV. This thesis is therefore 
designed to address the knowledge gaps in relation to HEV and the risk posed by this 
virus to blood supply safety in Australia. 
 
Maintaining a safe blood supply is an important aspect of medicine and an essential 
activity for the Blood Service. Surveillance studies for emerging infections in a population 
are important for the timely management and prevention of potential risk to blood safety, 
as well public health as a whole. Evidence based research via laboratory testing and data 
analyses and/or modelling are tools allowing for risk assessment. Risk assessment is 
required in order to determine if a particular emerging infectious disease is a risk to 
transfusion safety and if so, to identify new strategies to safeguard any risk posed by such 
a disease. 
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Thesis Structure 
  
The accumulating reports of the detection of HEV RNA in blood donors and cases of TT-
HEV have highlighted the risk posed by this virus to blood safety in the international 
transfusion community. This, together with increasing awareness globally with respect to 
this virus and limited prevalence studies on HEV in Australia, warranted an evidence-
based evaluation of the risk posed by this virus to the Australian blood supply. The 
hypothesis of the research was: HEV poses a risk to the safety of the Australian blood 
supply. This hypothesis was addressed by the following research aims: 
1. Determine if Australian blood donors were exposed to HEV  
2. Estimate the risk of TT-HEV  
3. Assess whether current Australian donor guidelines manage any TT-HEV risk 
4. Compare HEV prevalence in Australia with an HEV endemic country 
These aims were achieved in the following chapters of the thesis: 
 
Chapter 1: Transfusion Transmissible Infections and Hepatitis E Virus: Literature 
Review 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review on infectious agents transmissible through 
blood transfusion and introduces HEV as an emerging infectious agent. The chapter also 
gives an overview of HEV epidemiology in Australia and highlights the rationale for this 
research. 
 
Chapter 2: Seroprevalence of Hepatitis E virus in Australian Blood Donors and 
Implications for the Safety of the Blood Supply 
In this chapter, HEV seroprevalence in a population of Australian blood donors was 
measured and risk factors for HEV exposure assessed. These data were utilised to 
examine the effectiveness of current Australian blood safety strategies for the 
management of HEV. 
 
Chapter 3: Hepatitis E Virus RNA and Antigen Detection in Australian Blood 
Donations  
This section measured the rate of current HEV infection in Australian blood donations 
based on antigen and RNA detection. The risk of collecting an infectious donation based 
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on HEV RNA detection was also estimated. If any HEV RNA positive donations were 
identified, the infecting genotype of HEV was determined and the viral load measured. 
 
Chapter 4: Overseas-Acquired Hepatitis E Virus in Australia and Assessing the 
Threat to Blood Supply Safety 
In this chapter, trends in notified cases of HEV in Australia were analysed based on 
demographic details and place of acquisition. Countries considered at higher risk for HEV 
exposure were identified and the rate of importation estimated based on travel data. The 
study determined if existing Blood Service travel deferral policies assist with minimising the 
risk of TT-HEV from imported HEV infections. 
 
Chapter 5: Hepatitis E Virus Seroprevalence among Blood Donors in Nepal and 
Analysis of Variables as Possible Risk Factors 
In this chapter, HEV seroprevalence in Nepal (a developing country endemic for HEV) was 
measured and variables as possible risk factors analysed. Differences in HEV exposure 
status between Nepalese and Australian blood donors were explored. 
 
Chapter 6: Discussion, Conclusion, Risk Management Options and Future Research 
Directions 
This chapter discusses the overall findings from the individual research chapters. 
Management options to reduce TT-HEV risk and future directions from this study are 
discussed with overall conclusions made. 
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Research Hypothesis, Aims and Chapters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Compare HEV 
prevalence in Australia 
with an HEV endemic 
country 
 
2. Estimate the risk of TT-
HEV 
3. Assess whether current 
Australian donor 
guidelines manage any  
TT-HEV risk 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 
1. Determine if Australian 
blood donors were 
exposed to HEV 
Chapter 2 and 3 
Research Hypothesis: 
HEV poses a risk to the 
safety of the Australian 
blood supply  
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Chapter 1. Transfusion Transmissible Infections and Hepatitis E Virus: Literature 
Review 
 
Context 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of blood transfusion and risks associated 
with transfusion. Specifically, the chapter discusses infectious agents transmissible 
through blood transfusion and introduces HEV as one of the emerging infectious agents of 
risk to blood supply safety. The chapter also gives an overview of hepatitis E disease in 
regards to clinical features, epidemiology and laboratory diagnosis. The chapter ends with 
a rationale for undertaking this study. 
 
 
A section of this chapter (HEV Epidemiology in Australia) has been published in the journal 
Pathology:  
Shrestha AC, Faddy HM, Flower RL, Seed CR, Keller AJ. Hepatitis E virus: do locally 
acquired infections in Australia necessitate laboratory testing in acute hepatitis patients 
with no overseas travel history? Pathology 2015; 47: 97-100. Wolters Kluwer Health 
Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. 
 
 7 
 
1.1.  Transfusion Medicine 
Blood is a vital component of life. Blood donation is an important practice saving the lives 
of millions of people. Blood transfusion is the therapeutic use of blood, blood components 
(red blood cells, platelets, clinical plasma) or blood products (such as albumin, intravenous 
immunoglobulin, Anti-D, factor concentrates etc.) (1). Blood transfusion is routine for 
numerous clinical practices, from surgery, trauma, cancer, and anaemic care, to 
preventive measures such as haemolytic disease of the newborn. With scientific and 
clinical advances, transfusion practice has evolved as a separate discipline referred to as 
‘Transfusion medicine’ (19). 
 
Blood transfusion, however, is not without risk. The risks include adverse effects, incorrect 
component transfusions, transfusion reactions, such as transfusion related acute lung 
injury, and TTIs (20) (Figure 1.1). The benefits and relative risks associated with blood 
transfusion need to be communicated to patients whenever possible (3). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Possible risks associated with blood transfusion  
 
1.2. Transfusion Transmissible Infections 
TTIs are one of the potential threats to a safe transfusion (20). With the introduction of 
stringent donor selection guidelines, sensitive screening tests and pathogen inactivation 
methods, there has been a reduction in the associated risk (4, 20). Even though the risk of 
TTIs is lower than in the past, blood components and products are still subject to 
contamination with pathogens (4). However, risk of TTIs still varies widely between 
developed and developing countries. There is always a need to assess current risk, in 
order to prevent possible threat from the emergence of pathogens that are adapted to 
changing human behaviour and environmental conditions. 
Immunological Non-Immunological 
• Transfusion related acute lung injury (1) • Iron overload (21) 
• Allo-immunisation (22) • Transfusion-associated circulatory overload (23)   
• Transfusion related immune modulation (24) • Transfusion associated sepsis (25)  
• Haemolytic ABO/Rh mismatch (26) • Non-immune mediated haemolysis (27)   
• Transfusion-associated graft versus host disease (28) • Transfusion transmissible infections (29)  
• Allergic reactions (30)  
Transfusion Risks 
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Some of the characteristics of microbial agents considered a risk to transfusion include 
(31): 
 Presence and/or survival of the agent in one or more components of blood 
 Transmission by the intravenous route 
 Propensity for causing asymptomatic infections in the donor population 
 Cause infection with prolonged incubation period and long-term carrier state 
 Ability to cause symptomatic disease in transfusion recipient 
Microbial agents that have been demonstrated to be transfusion transmissible are viruses, 
bacteria, parasitic protozoa and prions. 
 
1.2.1. Viruses 
The most commonly transmitted agents via blood transfusion are viruses. Transfusion-
transmissible viruses include HIV-1/2, Human T-lymphotrophic Virus –I/II (HTLV-I/II), HCV, 
HBV, CMV and WNV (32-38). Other viruses that are transfusion transmissible include 
hepatitis A virus (HAV), HEV, hepatitis G virus (GBV-C), Epstein- Barr virus, DENV, 
human parvovirus B19, human herpesvirus 6, HHV-8, ZIKV and TT virus (38-48). HIV, 
HBV and HCV are considered to have the highest risk for transfusion safety and 
mandatory screening of blood donation is required for these agents in most countries. 
 
1.2.2. Parasites 
Parasitic infections that can be transmitted through blood transfusion include malaria 
caused by Plasmodium spp., babesiosis caused by Babesia spp., Chagas disease caused 
by T. cruzi, toxoplasmosis caused by Toxoplasma gondii and leishmaniasis caused by 
Leishmania spp. (49-53). The majority of these parasitic protozoa are transmitted via 
vectors, such as mosquitoes (Plasmodium spp.), ticks (Babesia spp) or sand flies 
(Leishmania spp.). Hence, to ensure a safe blood supply in some countries, blood donors 
are also assessed based on their area of residence for parasites like T. cruzi, or travel to 
areas where such vectors and diseases are present. 
 
1.2.3. Bacteria 
Transfusion transmitted bacterial infections are most likely due to contamination of the 
blood component during collection (54). Bacterial contamination of platelets has most often 
been reported with many different species implicated (54), especially those that are part of 
the normal skin flora. The introduction of more stringent skin disinfection methods and 
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diversion pouches have reduced the risk of bacterial transfusion transmission in many 
countries (55). Bacterial TTIs although less common may also be possible from 
bacteraemic donors donating and include T. pallidum, the causative agent of syphilis (56). 
Bacteremia in blood donors resulting in TTIs have also been reported with Yersinia 
enterocolitica and Staphylococcus aureus (54).  
 
1.2.4. Prions 
It has been established with animal studies that vCJD is transfusion transmissible (57). 
Transfusion transmitted vCJD has been reported in the United Kingdom (UK) (58). Data 
from the UK suggest the risk of vCJD transfusion transmission is 14% from infected 
donors donating blood within 40 months of the onset of disease (58). To date, no other 
prion disease has been shown to be transfusion transmitted. 
 
1.3. Screening for Transfusion Transmissible Infections 
Screening of blood donations or donors is necessary for the maintenance of a safe blood 
supply. Medical history interview and evaluation of blood donors determines their eligibility 
to donate. Selection of healthy blood donors plays a crucial role in the exclusion of infected 
individuals with underlying disease, which can be either clinical or sub-clinical, and pose a 
potential risk to the blood supply. However, there still remains a residual risk of collecting 
an infectious blood donation from donors who are in the window period (duration from 
infection to detection by laboratory testing).   
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends mandatory screening of all blood 
donations for HIV, HBV, HCV and T. pallidum. However, according to a report published in 
2011, blood donations are not screened for any TTIs in 39 countries (59). Additional 
screening for other infections is based on their epidemiological occurrence, such as 
seasonal screening for WNV in the United States of America (USA) or malaria testing in 
Australia for donors returning from endemic countries (60, 61). CMV testing and 
leucoreduction through filtration are strategies to reduce CMV transmission to high risk 
immunocompromised recipients in some countries (62). 
 
Screening for TTIs generally involves testing for antigens and/or antibodies against the 
infectious agents or pathogenic nucleic acid. The introduction of nucleic acid amplification 
testing (NAT) has reduced the residual risk of HIV, HBV and HCV transmission through 
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the ability to detect infectious agent during the early stages of infection (63-65). Sensitive 
screening tests and medical examination with stringent questionnaires coupled with donor 
deferral minimises TT risk. 
 
1.3.1. Screening for Transfusion Transmissible Infections in Australia 
In Australia, all blood donations are tested for HIV-1 and -2, HTLV-I and -II, HBV, HCV and 
T. pallidum (66, 67). Screening tests based on immunoassays include testing for HBV 
surface antigen (HBsAg), antibodies to the following: HIV -1 and -2, HTLV-I, and II, HCV 
and T. pallidum using T. pallidum haemagglutination (TPHA). All donations are also tested 
for HIV-1 RNA, HCV RNA and HBV DNA (67), using a transcription mediated amplification 
(TMA) multiplex assay. Residual risk for HIV, HTLV, HBV, HCV and Syphilis transfusion 
transmission is decreasing and small (less than 1 in a million units transfused, except HBV 
with approximately 1 in 764,000) compared to the USA and European estimates (66, 68). 
The prevalence of HBV and HCV is higher in the blood donor population compared to HIV, 
HTLV and Syphilis, however, the prevalence of all infections in the donor population is still 
lower than the general population (66, 67). 
 
Malaria is not endemic in Australia although local transmission and imported cases have 
been reported (69, 70). Malaria testing among the donor population in Australia is limited 
to those donors with a history of travel overseas or residency in countries endemic for 
malaria and/or a history of malaria infection (9). Donors are tested for malaria antibodies 
after 4 months from their return from malaria endemic countries or recovery from clinical 
infection (71). Donors reactive for anti- Plasmodium spp. antibodies are tested for parasitic 
antigens and DNA, and are eligible to donate only plasma for fractionation (61, 71, 72). In 
2011, 2.1% of ‘at risk’ donors were reactive to malaria antibodies and none to either 
antigens or DNA (66).  
 
CMV testing is performed to maintain an inventory of CMV seronegative cellular blood 
components required for specific groups of patients who are immunocompromised and are 
at risk for severe CMV disease. CMV management involves screening for CMV antibodies 
in selected donations, which is coupled with universal leucodepletion as an added safety 
precaution (10, 73). 
 
 11 
 
1.4. Pathogen Inactivation Technologies 
In addition to the stringent blood donor selection criteria and laboratory screening for TTIs, 
further safety can be achieved by leucoreduction and pathogen inactivation methods. 
Pathogen inactivation technologies (PITs) for red blood cells, platelets and clinical plasma 
have the potential to reduce the possible risk from emerging infections in these blood 
components, for which screening assays may not be available. At present, PITs for fresh 
blood components are available for treating platelet units as well as clinical plasma; no 
technologies are yet available for red blood cells. PITs are based on chemical inactivation 
and photo-inactivation methods (74). PITs have been adopted by different countries in 
Asia, Europe and the Middle-East (75). However, lack of cost-effectiveness and treatment 
related damage to a range of cellular functions in PIT treated components are some of the 
issues that prevent implementation of such technologies in other countries, including 
Australia. 
 
1.5. Emerging Infectious Diseases and Blood Safety 
Infectious diseases that have recently appeared in the population or have increased in 
incidence within the past two decades and still threaten to increase in the future are 
termed emerging infectious diseases (76, 77). The re-emergence of a disease refers to an 
increase in incidence of a disease that had previously declined (5). Emergence and re-
emergence of infectious disease can be attributed to various factors related to changes in 
host range, virulence of pathogens, climatic conditions, vectors (if involved in 
transmission), improved detection capacities and travel/immigration of people (78, 79). 
 
Although there is a decline in risk associated with well-known TTIs due to stringent donor 
selection and sensitive screening tests in many developed countries, threat to blood safety 
from emerging infectious diseases for which preventable measures may not be available 
still remains. Emerging pathogens currently of risk to blood safety include WNV, DENV, 
Babesia spp., HEV, HHV-8, T. cruzi, chikungunya virus, ZIKV and prion (causing vCJD) (5, 
29, 48). Emerging infectious diseases may impact on transfusion safety with the reduction 
in donor attendance and hence blood sufficiency, or an increase in transfusion 
transmission risk if blood borne.  
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1.5.1. Emerging Infectious Diseases and Blood Safety in Australia 
Surveillance for emerging infectious diseases that may impact on transfusion safety is of 
paramount importance to the Blood Service (66). Recent emerging infectious diseases 
include regular dengue outbreaks in northern Queensland, a reported case of human 
babesiosis in New South Wales (NSW) and Hendra virus cases in Queensland (66). 
Dengue is not considered endemic in Australia; however, both imported cases and 
indigenous outbreaks have occurred (80). Risk of collecting a dengue infected donation 
during the 2004 outbreak in Cairns was estimated to be 1 in 19,759, and during the 2008-
2009 outbreak was approximated as 1 in 7,146 (11, 81). The risk of Ross River Virus 
(RRV) transfusion transmission was estimated to be 1 in 13,542 donations, during a 2004 
outbreak in Cairns (82). A first case of probable transfusion transmitted RRV has been 
reported in Western Australia (82).  
 
A case of locally-acquired HEV has been reported in an Australian liver transplant 
recipient, who also received blood transfusion (83). However, there was insufficient 
evidence to determine the mode of transmission. Reported cases of TT-HEV overseas 
(16, 17), the detection of HEV RNA in blood donors in other countries (13), warrants an 
investigation into the risk HEV poses to the safety of the Australian blood supply. 
 
1.6. Viral Hepatitis and Transfusion Risk 
Inflammation of the liver and necrosis of hepatocytes resulting from viral infection is 
referred to as viral hepatitis. These viruses in general include HAV, HBV, HCV, Hepatitis D 
virus (HDV), and HEV (84). HAV and HEV are mainly transmitted through the faecal-oral 
route causing self-limited infections and manifest as acute or asymptomatic hepatitis to 
fulminant hepatitis. However, there is evidence of transfusion transmission associated with 
both of these viruses (39, 40). Compared to HAV, the clinical course of HEV is more 
severe (85). HBV and HCV are transmitted parenterally, through sexual contact, 
perinatally and manifest as acute to chronic hepatitis leading to cirrhosis and 
hepatocellular carcinoma (86, 87). HBV and HCV are both transfusion transmissible and 
blood donations are screened routinely for these viruses in many countries (59). HDV 
replicates in the presence of HBV and co-infection increases the severity of disease (88). 
GBV-C is closely related to HCV and causes persistent infection, is parentally transmitted 
but is not known to be a primary pathogen (89). Given that HBV and HCV are routinely 
screened before transfusion and residual risk is therefore minimised, risk associated with 
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HAV and HEV still needs to be assessed. Although vaccines are available for HAV and 
HEV, the later poses a higher risk to individuals in terms of disease severity, and thus HEV 
is considered a current emerging infectious disease of possible threat to blood supply 
safety. Moreover, HEV has recently gained international significance in the transfusion 
medicine community. 
 
1.7. Hepatitis E Virus (HEV) 
The availability of serological tests for HAV and HBV distinguished a third virus, then 
referred to as non-A non-B (NANB) hepatitis virus, which was associated with waterborne 
outbreaks (90-92). It was not until 1983, that HEV was first observed under immune 
electron microscopy in stool samples from a volunteer experimentally infected with NANB 
hepatitis (93). Transmission to non-human primates (Macacus cynomologus) was also 
demonstrated (93). Hepatitis E was also known as enterically transmitted non-A non- B 
hepatitis (ET-NANB) (94). Isolation of cDNA from HEV further identified this virus as 
different from hepatitis A (95). This facilitated the development of serological assays to 
allow for an increased understanding of the epidemiology of this virus. HEV is classified in 
the genus Hepevirus in the Hepeviridae family (96), consisting of genotypes 1 to 4, 
infecting humans (13). The family also includes viruses that infect birds, bats, rodents and 
fish, and classification of HEV variants is still in progress (97, 98).  
 
HEV epidemics occur periodically in developing countries and are associated with faecal 
contamination of water and poor sanitation (99). In developed nations, HEV is related to 
travel to countries endemic for HEV (100, 101). However, autochthonous HEV is 
increasingly being reported in many countries (102), indicating the possibility of local 
transmission. Interestingly, many cases in developed countries are from contaminated 
undercooked food or contact with infected animals rather than the classical faecal oral 
route seen in many developing countries (103-108). HEV transfusion transmission (17, 
109) demonstrates that a blood borne phase exists, and may contribute to local 
transmission. 
 
1.7.1. Morphology and Structure 
HEV is an icosahedral virus with a diameter of 27-34nm (93, 110, 111). The absence of 
lipid envelope renders the virus stability in bile and thus excretion in faeces, providing 
access to the environment (112). The HEV genome is 7.5 kb in length, comprising of a 
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single stranded positive sense RNA with open reading frames (ORFs) capped at 5’ and 
polyadenylated at 3’ termini. ORF 1 closest to the 5’ end codes for non-structural proteins, 
ORF 2 next to the 3’ end codes for structural proteins and ORF 3 codes for cellular 
proteins with kinase activity, which overlaps ORF 1 and ORF 2 (Figure 1.2) (95, 112-115). 
 
Figure 1.2: Schematic diagram of HEV genome [ Open reading frame (ORF), 
Untranslated regions (UTRs), Methyl transferase (MeT), Y, V and X (domains), Papain like 
cysteine polymerase (PCP), RNA Helicase (Hel), RNA dependent RNA polymerase 
(RdRp), Poly Adenylated (polyA), D1 and D2 (hydrophobic domains), P1 and P2 (proline-
rich domains)] (Reproduced with permission from the publisher (116))  
 
1.7.2. Genotypes 
Based on phylogenetic analyses of full length sequences, HEV is classified into 4 
genotypes (1-4), which are further divided into subgenotypes 1 (a-e), 2 (a, b), 3 (a-j), 4 (a-
g) (117). This classification into genotypes was previously based on differences in partial 
genome sequences, such as variation of more than 20% in the nucleotides in the ORF2 
region (97, 118). Currently, HEV genotypes are characterised on the basis of sequences 
of ORF 1, ORF 2 as well as ORF 3 regions (118). The 371 base region of ORF 1, 
spanning nucleotides 80-450 has been used in phylogenetic analyses, which is considered 
to be consistent with analyses undertaken with full-length sequences (119). A region of 
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148 bases from ORF 2 between nucleotide positions 6322 and 6469 has also been 
considered in phylogenetic analysis (119). All HEV strains belong to a single serotype (13).  
 
HEV genotypes vary in epidemiological distribution, mode of transmission (Figure 1.3), 
and pathogenicity of disease. Genotype 1 includes human HEV strains reported from Asia 
and Africa (120). Genotype 2 is also solely a human virus, with strains occurring in Mexico 
and some African countries (13). Genotype 3 infects both humans and swine, and strains 
are found globally (13). Genotype 4 also includes human and swine viruses, and is 
distributed in southeast Asia (117, 120, 121). HEV genotypes 3 has been isolated from 
deer, mongoose, rats and rabbits and genotype 4 from cattle and sheep (122). 
 
Genotypes 1 and 2 are associated with the faecal oral transmission route in developing 
countries. Genotypes 3 and 4 occur predominantly in swine and are related to zoonotic 
transmission to humans via pork consumption or contact, in developed countries (13). 
Genotype 4 has also been isolated from pig livers in India (122), and genotype 3 from pigs 
in Thailand (123). HEV RNA (unknown genotype) has been detected in swine in Nepal 
(124). 
 
Genotypes 1 and 2 cause self-limiting hepatitis in young adults with increasing mortality in 
pregnant women and immunocompromised patients (125). Genotypes 3 and 4 cause 
clinically apparent hepatitis in older individuals (125). 
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Figure 1.3: Geographical distribution of HEV cases and prevalence of genotypes 
(Reproduced with permission from the publisher (126)) 
 
1.7.3. Pathogenesis 
The first attempt to understand HEV pathogenesis was initiated before HEV was 
completely identified. This involved infection of a human volunteer and non-human 
primates (M. cynomolgous) with an infectious inoculum (93). This study demonstrated that 
the infectious agent was transmitted by the faecal oral route. It has been proposed from an 
in vitro study that the truncated structural protein (p239) of HEV binds to the heparin 
sulphate proteoglycan receptors and penetrates susceptible cells (127, 128). The hepatic 
cell lines that have been used for propagation of HEV include PLC/PRF/5, Huh7A, 
HepG2/C3A (128). Other cell lines used include the lung carcinoma cell line A549, and the 
colon carcinoma line Caco-2 (13, 128). A proposed model of HEV replication is 
characterised by entry of the virus by endocytosis into the host cell, release of RNA after 
uncoating of capsid, translation and replication of the genome in the cytoplasm, synthesis 
of capsid protein that packages RNA to virions and subsequent release (129). 
Pathogenesis of HEV has been studied in M. cynomolgous with intravenous inoculation of 
bile or faeces containing HEV (130). The experimental animals were infected with HEV 
and after 2-3 weeks, a rise in serum alanine aminotransferases (ALT), histopathological 
changes in the liver, appearance of HEV antigen in the liver, virus in bile and HEV 
antibodies in serum were observed (130).  
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The ethical consequences of the following studies are questionable, however, are included 
in this review as they are in the published literature. HEV pathogenesis in a human 
volunteer was studied with oral administration of stool extracts from patients with 
presumed faeco-oral NANB hepatitis (93). The infected volunteer developed clinical 
features of acute hepatitis 36 days after inoculation. Virus-like particles were observed in 
stool collected on days 28, 43, 44 and 45 after inoculation (93). Another human volunteer 
based investigation was performed to understand the clinical picture of HEV infection with 
oral administration of a stool suspension from a patient diagnosed with ET-NANB hepatitis 
(131). This study involved the investigator himself ingesting the inoculum. Clinical features 
developed 30 days post-inoculation followed by an icteric phase (38 days post 
inoculation), rise in serum ALT and bilirubin (Figure 1.4) (131). Virus was detected in the 
serum after 22 days and in stool collected after 34 days post-inoculation. HEV antibody 
appeared on day 41 (131). In a report of TT-HEV, the virus was detected in blood after 5 
weeks and for up to 12 weeks post transfusion (16). HEV IgM was detected after 9 weeks 
with decreasing reactivity after 19 weeks (16). HEV IgM is detectable 4 days after the 
onset of acute hepatitis, with a higher detection rate within 4 weeks (132). In general, HEV 
IgM declines after 3-6 months of illness (129, 133). Some studies indicate that HEV IgG 
persists for 1-2 years (94, 134), however, others demonstrate IgG to persist for 14 years 
after infection (135). In the general course of HEV infection, HEV RNA persists in blood for 
the duration of 4 weeks and in stool for 6 weeks (Figure 1.4). 
 
Figure 1.4: Diagrammatic representation of HEV infection with stages of RNA detection 
and serological responses (Reproduced with permission from the publisher (136)) 
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1.7.4. Clinical Manifestations 
HEV is associated with self-limited acute phase disease with recognized cases of chronic 
hepatitis (137). The incubation period is 15-60 days (mean of 40 days) (138). Clinical 
features include anorexia, epigastric pain, discoloured urine, nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, 
fever, jaundice, elevation of serum transaminase and hepatomegaly (93, 131, 137, 139). 
The majority of HEV infections are asymptomatic, and rates vary between developing 
countries (where up to 50% of cases can be asymptomatic) and developed countries 
(where the asymptomatic rate can be 67-98%) (140). During outbreaks in developing 
countries, a case fatality rate of 0.5-4% has been reported (137). Incidence of disease and 
fulminant hepatitis failure is even higher in pregnant women during the third trimester 
(141). Maternal mortality in pregnancy also varies with geographical region, and reaches 
10-25% in developing countries (13, 142). Cases of chronic HEV infection have occurred 
in solid-organ transplant (kidney, liver and pancreas) recipients (143). Chronic HEV 
disease in immune suppressive conditions like HIV (with HEV RNA persistence for 24 
months), and reactivation in a lymphoblastic leukemia patient after stem cell 
transplantation have also been reported (144, 145). Non-hepatic manifestations of HEV 
such as pancreatitis, haematological manifestations (thrombocytopenia, hemolysis), 
autoimmune phenomena, neurological syndromes (Guillian-Barre syndrome, 
meningoencephalitis, pseudotumor cerebri, nerve palsies) have been reported (137).  
 
1.7.5. Modes of Transmission 
HEV is recognised as a food and water borne disease, transmitted through drinking 
contaminated water and through the consumption of raw or uncooked infected meat (12). 
There are other possible modes of transmission including, contact with animals, 
transfusion transmission and vertical transmission (Figure 1.5). 
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Figure 1.5: Different modes of HEV transmission 
 
1.7.5.1. Faeco-oral Transmission 
HEV outbreaks in developing countries have been associated with water contamination 
and the route of transmission is faeco-oral. This was demonstrated by detection of the 
virus in sewage and drinking water, and in the serum of patients in India (146). Waterborne 
HEV epidemics have occurred in many developing countries, including India (1955-1956, 
1975-1976, 1978-1982, 1989), Nepal (1973, 1981, 1987) and Sudan (2004) (147, 148). 
HEV genotypes 1 and 2 are associated with such a mode of transmission (125). 
 
1.7.5.2. Food Borne and Zoonotic Transmission 
Locally-acquired HEV in developed countries has been associated with the consumption of 
raw or uncooked meat, such as pork, where HEV genotypes 3 and 4 are implicated (149). 
HEV genotype 3 has been detected in pig livers sold in grocery stores in the USA and 
Germany (150, 151). Pigs are natural reservoirs of HEV. Faeco-oral transmission in pigs 
can occur with shedding of infectious HEV in faeces and contamination of water sources in 
pig farms (122). A study in the USA has shown that pit manure slurry is a potential source 
of HEV infection and could contribute to contamination of the environment (152). However, 
in this study there was no evidence for contamination of drinking or surface water with 
HEV on or near the pig farms. Other animals (deer, boar, goats, sheep, bats, cows, 
camels, horses, rats, rabbits) have also been found to be infected with the virus (125, 153, 
154). Higher HEV seroprevalence has been reported among workers in pig farms 
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compared to the general population, which indicates contact may be another possible 
mode of transmission (155). 
 
1.7.5.3. Transfusion Transmission 
The presence of HEV in blood allows for the transmission via blood and blood 
components. This has been demonstrated by detection of virus in the blood of HEV 
infected blood donors and recipients after transfusion. TT-HEV has been reported in 
France (17), the UK (16), Japan (109, 156) and Saudi Arabia (157). A retrospective study 
among blood transfusion recipients has shown a higher prevalence compared to control 
groups in an endemic country like India (157). A fatal case of HEV (genotype 3) after 
infusion of infected lymphocytes in a leukemia patient in Germany has been reported 
(158). HEV has been shown to be transmitted via clinical plasma treated with the Intercept 
system (synthetic psoralene amotosalen hydrochloride (HCL) and ultraviolet light A) 
demonstrating resistance of the virus to this type of PIT (18).  
 
1.7.5.4. Vertical Transmission 
There is evidence of HEV transmission from mother to child. HEV RNA has been detected 
in infants born to HEV infected mothers, with a variable rate of transmission, ranging from 
33.33% in India (159) to 100% in United Arab Emirates (160). 
 
1.7.6. Epidemiology 
HEV causes acute hepatitis but in many cases the infection is subclinical (asymptomatic 
rate in developing countries is up to 50% while in developed countries is 67-98%) (140), 
therefore, the actual incidence of disease is not known. Hence, published data on disease 
prevalence as well as reported cases in such countries provide an estimate of the global 
burden. Prevalence varies in developing countries where HEV is considered endemic, with 
the occurrence of outbreaks associated with water borne transmission. In developed 
countries, the disease occurs sporadically and is related to food borne transmission, 
zoonotic transmission and travel to countries endemic for HEV. The global annual disease 
burden for HEV genotype 1 and 2 in 2005 was estimated to be 20.1 million incident 
infections, which resulted in an estimate of 3.3 million symptomatic cases, 70,000 deaths 
and 3,000 still births (161). This study represented 71% of world’s population with 
incidence greatest in the younger age group (15 to 20 years) (161). The burden for HEV 
genotypes 3 and 4 is not known. HEV seroprevalence ranges from less than 5% to 53% in 
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different countries and also varies due to variability in sensitivity and specificity between 
assays (Table 1.1). A seroprevalence study conducted in southwestern France with 
different assays has demonstrated variable prevalence (162). Hence, comparison of the 
seroprevalence between regions needs to be interpreted with caution. HEV RNA has been 
detected in blood donors from China, the UK, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and 
Scotland (Table 1.2). Genotypes 3 and 4 are reported from China, Japan and are 
emerging in developed countries related to food borne transmission (13, 163, 164). 
 
Table 1.1: Global HEV IgG prevalence  
Country Year (published) 
n 
(cohort) 
HEV 
IgG 
% 
Assay used Refe-rence 
Australia 1995 279 (blood donors) 0.4 Genelabs, Inc. (165) 
Bangladesh 2015 1,009  (blood donors) 49.8 Wantai (166) 
China 2009 44,816 (blood donors) 32.6 Wantai (167) 
France 2011 
512 
529 
(blood donors) 
52.5 
16.6 
 
Wantai 
Genelabs 
 
(162) 
(168) 
 
Germany 2012 4,422 (general population) 16.8 Mikrogen (169) 
Ghana 2012 239 (blood donors) 
12.9 
4.7 
10 
Wantai, 
Recomline, 
RecomWell 
(170) 
Hong Kong 2013 450 (archived sample) 28.7 
Biotec 
laboratories (171) 
Hungary 2007 264 (hepatitis patients) 10.6 - (172) 
India 1998 200 (blood donors) 18.6 In-house (173) 
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Country Year (published) 
n 
(cohort) 
HEV 
IgG 
% 
Assay used Refe-rence 
Iran 2013 530 blood donors) 14.3 Dia Pro (174) 
Japan 2010 22,027 (general population) 5.3 In -house (175) 
Korea 2006 
147 
(health check 
examinees) 
23.1 
14.3 
Wantai 
Genelabs (176) 
Nepal 1997 757 (general population) 24.6 
Diagnostic 
Biotechnology (177) 
Netherland 2013 5,239 (blood donors) 27 Wantai (178) 
New 
Zealand 2007 
265 
(blood donors) 4.2 Wantai (179) 
Scotland 2013 1,559 (blood donors) 4.7 Wantai (180) 
Spain 2006 1,536 (general population) 7.3 Biokit (181) 
Switzerland 2011 550 (blood donors) 4.9 MP Diagnostics (182) 
UK 2008 487 (blood donors) 15.8 Wantai (183) 
USA 2013 1,939 (blood donors) 18.8 Wantai (184) 
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Table 1.2: HEV RNA prevalence in blood donors 
Country Year (published) 
n 
(Blood 
donations/donors) 
HEV RNA 
prevalence 
Geno- 
type 
Refe- 
rence 
Austria 2015 58, 915 (donors) 0.012% 3 (185) 
China 2009 44,816 (donations) 0.067% 1 & 4 (167) 
France 2014 53,234 (donations) 0.041% Unknown (186) 
Germany 2012 41,325 (donations) 0.081% 3 (187) 
Japan 2013 ~2,000,000 (donations) 0.012% 3 & 4 (188) 
Netherland 2013 45,415 (donations) 0.037% 3 (178) 
Scotland 2013 43,560 (donations) 0.007% 3 (180) 
Spain 2014 9,998 (donors) 0.030% 3 (189) 
UK 2014 225,000 (donations) 0.014% 3 (190) 
USA 2016 18,829 (donations) 0.011% Unknown (191) 
 
1.7.7. HEV Epidemiology in Australia 
Data from the Commonwealth Department of Health indicate there were 378 HEV notified 
cases between 1999-2013, with an average of 25 cases per year (Figure 1.6) (192). 
Higher numbers of cases were reported from NSW and Victoria. Most cases were 
associated with travel to HEV endemic countries, mostly Asia (193), and few cases were 
reported to be locally-acquired. The true incidence of HEV and exposure status of the 
Australian population, however, is unknown due to subclinical infection.  
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Figure 1.6: HEV notified cases in Australia from 1999–2013, by year (A) and age group 
(B) (Data Source: Australian Government Department of Health, National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System) (192)  
 
A seroprevalence study of HEV in 1995 among selected groups determined HEV IgG 
prevalence of 0.4% in blood donors, 2.2% in travellers and 7.7% in non-A, non-B, non- C 
hepatitis patients as well as refugees (165). Retrospective study of stored sera from 
patients in the 1970s (NANB hepatitis) have shown serological evidence of HEV IgG (194). 
  
1.7.7.1. HEV in Animals 
HEV IgG prevalence has been reported to be 17% in wild caught pigs and 30-95% in 
commercially raised pigs (195). This study used an in-house assay with unknown 
sensitivity and specificity (195). Transmission from pigs to humans is possible through 
ingesting infected undercooked meat or contact with infected animals. An avian HEV strain 
associated with big liver and spleen disease in chickens has been identified in Australia in 
1980 (196). However, avian strains are not known to be transmitted to humans (140).  
 
1.7.7.2. Locally-Acquired Infection in Humans 
There are limited data on the extent of locally-acquired HEV in Australia and the burden of 
autochthonous HEV therefore requires investigation. The first case of locally-acquired HEV 
infection was reported in 1995 from the Northern Territory (NT) (197). The source of 
infection in this patient was not known (197). A case each in Victoria and Queensland 
were also notified as being locally-acquired in 2005 (198), however, neither case had been 
published in peer reviewed journals. 24 HEV cases have been reported in NSW in 2014, 
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all with no recent overseas travel history and likely to be linked to the consumption of 
undercooked pork (199-201). Domestically acquired HEV infection in Australia, associated 
with genotype 3, has recently been reported in a liver transplant recipient (83). Several 
possible modes of transmission were postulated, including via transplantation, blood 
transfusion, or through the consumption of contaminated food or water by the recipient. A 
study in 1999 has shown HEV IgG prevalence of up to 95% in Australian pig herds (195), 
which indicates that zoonotic transmission may be possible. Other modes of transmission 
such as person to person, congenital, transfusion and organ transplant have been 
documented overseas, (13, 108, 190) which could contribute to the occurrence of locally-
acquired infection in Australia, and associated risks therefore need to be assessed.  
 
1.7.8. HEV in Nepal - a Developing Country Endemic for HEV 
In this study, Nepal was selected as a developing and HEV endemic country for a 
comparison with a developed and presumed HEV non-endemic country (Australia). HEV 
epidemics in Nepal have occurred in 1973, 1981-1982, 1987, 1995 and 2014 (128, 148, 
202). HEV IgG prevalence in 1999-2000 was 38%, with the Kathmandu valley designated 
as hyper-endemic and rural areas as non-endemic for HEV (148). Epidemics have been 
associated with faecal contamination of water, and molecular characterization has shown 
genotype 1 as the cause of acute HEV infection (203). HEV during pregnancy is a 
concern, with 19% mortality and 5% of women having miscarriages (204). HEV antibodies 
and RNA have been demonstrated in farm swine from the Kathmandu valley (124), 
indicating the possibility of zoonotic transmission. HEV in Nepalese blood donors and the 
impact of this virus on blood safety has not yet been studied. 
 
1.8. Prevention 
HEV infection can be prevented by avoiding exposure to the virus. This may include 
improvement of sanitation and the supply of clean drinking water. Zoonotic transmission is 
preventable by the proper handling of uncooked meat and its proper cooking before 
consumption. A study on thermal stability of HEV has shown that heating to 560C for one 
hour resulted in an inactivation rate of ~80% (205). However, this varied with genotype of 
HEV.  
 
HEV is also preventable by vaccination. Two HEV vaccines have been developed, but 
neither is licensed worldwide. A recombinant vaccine was derived from the Sf9 insect cell 
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line using baculovirus, encoding ORF2 of a Pakistani HEV strain (206). This prototype 
vaccine was trialled in Rhesus monkeys (206). A Phase I clinical trial of this vaccine 
(produced by DynCorp, Rockville. Md., USA) was conducted at the Walter Reed Army 
Institute of Research and it was determined this prototype was safe and immunogenic, but 
required further evaluation (207). A Phase II trial of the vaccine was planned with the 
Nepalese community, but approval to commence the trial was not given for ethical reasons 
(208). However, the trial was performed with the Nepalese Army, and efficacy of three 
doses of vaccine was found to be 95.5%, with unclear information on durability of immunity 
(209).  
 
A second vaccine, referred to as HEV 239, is based on the expression of a recombinant 
protein encoded by ORF 2 (HEV genotype 1) in Escherichia coli (210). A clinical phase II 
trial conducted in China determined this prototype vaccine was safe and immunogenic 
(211). A Phase III trial of HEV 239 (Hecolin : Xiamen Innovax Biotech, Xiamen, China) 
determined an efficacy of 100% (212). This vaccine has recently been approved for use in 
China (213). As of May 2015, WHO has not recommended routine use of an HEV vaccine 
in populations where HEV is epidemic and sporadic (214) . 
 
Passive immunisation with immunoglobulin preparations in animal studies have been 
shown to be effective at preventing infection (139). Passive immunoprophylaxis with low 
titre human serum immunoglobulin has not been successful in humans (139). Monoclonal 
antibodies against HEV for use in humans has not been tested (139). 
 
1.9. Treatment 
Acute cases of HEV that are self-limiting do not require treatment. Generally, severe cases 
of HEV are treated with ribavirin (215). Treatment of chronic cases of HEV includes 
treatment with ribavirin at doses of 200 mg for 3 months (216). In addition, treatment with 
1,000 mg ribavirin per day divided in two doses for 10 days (depending on the renal 
function of the patient) has been reported to be successful (216). A dose of 135 µg/week 
of pegylated interferon (IFN)–α 2a for 3 months has been shown to clear HEV RNA in 
chronic HEV patients (217). Likewise, pegylated IFN–α 2b is reported to be useful in 
chronic HEV patients (218). The use of ribavirin is contraindicated during pregnancy (13).  
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1.9.1. Diagnosis 
HEV is similar to other hepatitis viruses in terms of clinical features. In majority of 
developed countries diagnosis is based on risk factors, such as recent travel history and 
risk of zoonotic or food borne transmission. A case is confirmed based on laboratory 
diagnostic tests and the patient’s clinical features. Different methods for HEV diagnosis 
and blood donor screening are outlined below and summarised in table 1.3. 
 
1.9.1.1. Immune Electron Microscopy 
Immune electron microscopy can provide direct evidence of the virus, as was used to 
demonstrate the causative agent of NANB hepatitis transmitted by the faeco-oral route 
(93, 219). In this technique, a stool sample was treated with serum containing antibodies 
to HEV, which agglutinated HEV if present and enabled detection under electron 
microscope. The need for an expensive microscope and its non-sensitivity makes it less 
applicable for clinical diagnosis (220). 
 
1.9.1.2. Serological Tests 
Serological-based tests include the detection of HEV IgG, IgM, IgA and HEV antigen in 
serum or plasma. Enzyme immuno assay (EIA) based tests are widely used for laboratory 
diagnosis of patients. Antibody testing assays are generally based on detection of 
antibodies against epitopes of the gene products of ORF2 and ORF3 (221). EIA kits with 
antigens from one genotype of HEV are able to detect antibodies against a different 
genotype (222). 
 
HEV IgG Assays 
Detection of HEV IgG in an individual indicates a previous infection with HEV. This 
antibody may persists in an infected individual for years (135). Thus, the acute phase of 
HEV infection cannot be differentiated by detection of HEV IgG. However, these assays 
have important practical value in determining the exposure status of an individual. Studies 
with different commercial EIAs have shown variability in sensitivity (170, 223, 224). 
Seroprevalence determined with different assays therefore needs interpretation with 
caution. The Wantai HEV IgG ELISA manufactured by Beijing Wantai Biological 
Pharmaceutical Enterprise Co., Ltd is considered to be the most specific and sensitive 
assay available at present (184). This commercial assay has also been widely used for 
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HEV seroprevalence studies (162, 178, 184, 225), and is therefore preferred for the 
current study to allow a comparison with these other studies. 
 
HEV IgM Assays 
The acute phase of HEV infection can be diagnosed by the detection of HEV IgM. This 
class of antibody is detectable after the onset of acute hepatitis, and can last for up to 3-6 
months post-infection (129). Both ELISA and immune chromatographic assays have been 
developed. Evaluation of HEV IgM commercial assays has shown variability in sensitivity 
and specificity (226).  
 
HEV IgA Assays 
HEV IgA has been detected in acute HEV patients, with a more prominent response 
against HEV genotype 1 compared to genotype 3 (227). It is considered that HEV IgA 
based ELISAs are more specific than HEV IgM assays, and diagnostic accuracy increases 
with use of both types (228). Such an assay can be used as a supplementary tool for 
diagnosis of acute HEV with no IgM response (229). However, the diagnostic application 
of this assay still requires further investigation. 
 
HEV Antigen Assays 
HEV antigens appear in the blood prior to the appearance of specific antibodies and the 
antigen assays are used for the direct detection of the virus (230). HEV antigen detection 
assays based on an indirect sandwich EIA have been developed using monoclonal 
antibodies produced against gene products of ORF2 of HEV genotype 2 (230). 
Concordance of HEV RNA and antigen detection with this assay has been shown to be 
81% in clinical patients (230). 
 
1.9.1.3. Nucleic Acid Amplification Assays 
After HEV infection, peak viremia occurs during the incubation period of 2-6 weeks, and 
viral RNA is not detectable in blood until 3 weeks after the onset of symptoms (13). Viral 
nucleic acid detection is a sensitive and specific method of diagnosis. However, such 
assays have a high cost associated with reagents, instruments and the requirement for 
trained personnel. NAT provides an added advantage in immunocompromised patients 
who fail to develop antibody responses or to monitor responses to antiviral treatment 
(220).  
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NAT methods for HEV RNA detection includes real-time reverse transcription polymerase 
chain (RT-PCR). Nested RT-PCR with primers designated to three ORFs of specific HEV 
strains has been described to allow rapid detection of the virus in serum (231). RT-PCR 
based assays targeting ORF2 have been validated to be efficient for the detection and 
quantification of all the four HEV genotypes (232). Amplified PCR products are detected by 
gel electrophoresis or within the real time PCR system. Real-time RT-PCR has been 
demonstrated to be more sensitive than nested PCR. Though specific there is variability in 
sensitivity of PCR based assays (233). The need for standardization of HEV RNA NAT 
assays led to a collaborative approach that has established genotype 3a HEV strain with a 
unitage of 250,000 IU/ml as international standard for HEV RNA (234). Loop mediated 
isothermal amplification assays have demonstrated rapid detection of genotypes 1 and 2 
with high sensitivity, without the requirement of thermocycling equipment (235).  
 
TMA technology has been developed by Gen-Probe and the Procleix® system uses this 
technology, which is a fully integrated, automated nucleic acid testing system for blood 
screening for infectious diseases. TMA can amplify either DNA or RNA and produces an 
RNA amplicon (236). A prototype HEV assay based on this technology has been 
developed (Appendix III.d) (189). The limit of detection for this assay has shown to be 7.9 
IU/ml (189). 
 
1.9.1.4. Biochemical Tests 
An increase in serum levels of bilirubin, ALT and aspartate aminotransferases (AST) is 
observed in acute HEV infection. However, none of these are specific as these 
biochemical markers increase in other forms of liver injury and viral hepatitis (220). Higher 
prevalence of HEV serological markers have been demonstrated with elevated levels of 
ALT (225). 
 
1.9.1.5. Cellular Immune Response 
Enzyme linked immunosorbent spot (ELISPOT), has been developed to test peripheral 
blood mononuclear cells for IFN-γ secreted in response to HEV infection (220). ELISPOT 
assays have been shown to correlate with the enzyme immune assays for the detection of 
past exposure to HEV (220). The utility of ELISPOT for HEV diagnosis is under evaluation 
(220, 237).  
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Table 1.3. Different testing methodologies for HEV diagnosis and blood donor screening 
Test 
methods 
 Diagnosis Screening Sensitivity 
/specificity 
Immune 
electron 
microscopy 
 Direct detection of virus 
indication of current 
infection 
Unsuitable Insensitive  
IgG ELISA  Past exposure or indication 
of recent re-infection 
Serosurveillance 
study to 
understand risk 
factors 
Varies between 
commercial assays 
(238). Sensitivity: 
65-98% 
Specificity: 74-100% 
IgM ELISA 
 
 Evidence of recent infection Surveillance 
study to 
determine 
recently infected 
donors 
Varies between 
commercial assays 
(239). Specificity:84-
>99%, Sensitivity: 
52-81% 
Antigen 
ELISA 
 Indication of current 
infection 
Early virus 
detection 
Variable 
concordance: RNA 
positive in 50% of 
antigen positive 
(225) 
Antigen positive in 
40% of RNA positive 
(240) 
RT-PCR 
 
 Gold standard for current 
infection 
Confirmation of 
current/recent 
infection 
Varies with 
commercial assays. 
Altona Diagnostics 
LOD 37.8 IU/ml 
(241) 
TMA  Commercially 
unavailable 
Screening for 
infected 
donations 
LOD 7.9 IU/ml (189) 
Biochemical  Liver function test as 
indicator of acute hepatitis 
Unsuitable Non-specific 
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1.10. Hepatitis E - An Emerging Infectious Disease 
Since 1955, hepatitis E has been associated with a large number of water-borne disease 
outbreaks (242). However, the causative agent was not identified until 1983 (93). HEV 
outbreaks continue to occur in many developing countries including Bangladesh, Nepal 
and Sudan (202, 243, 244). HEV is considered endemic in many developing countries.  
In developed countries, HEV was traditionally associated with travellers returning from 
developing countries endemic for HEV. However, in recent decades, there have been 
increased numbers of reports of locally-acquired cases, mainly associated with zoonotic 
transmission (12, 104). Development of more sensitive serological and molecular 
techniques for laboratory testing of HEV have also facilitated increased identification and 
reporting of HEV (128).  
 
In many developed countries, travel to countries endemic for HEV is a risk factor for HEV 
infection. As more people are likely to travel to such countries in the future (for example 
due to decreased cost of international travel) (245), the incidence of HEV infection may 
increase. Consumption of undercooked infected meat or contact with infected animals is 
another risk factor associated with HEV infection; which has the potential to expose a 
greater number of people to this virus (162, 246). These factors threaten to increase the 
incidence of HEV in the future. Hence, HEV is considered an emerging pathogen of public 
health importance. 
 
1.11. Conclusion and Rationale for the Study 
Hepatitis E is an emerging infectious disease of public health concern. As the majority of 
cases are asymptomatic, HEV RNA has been detected in blood donors and cases of TT-
HEV have been reported in developed countries (17, 190, 247). HEV transmission to 
immunocompromised individuals can cause chronic infection (12). Therefore, there is an 
increasing concern for HEV among the international transfusion community, including 
Australia. With limited HEV prevalence data in Australia and unavailability of vaccine for 
HEV, there is a possible threat of an HEV outbreak from imported or locally-acquired 
infections. This has the potential to be a risk to the safety of Australia’s blood supply. 
Hence, this study is designed to measure the prevalence of past and current HEV infection 
in Australian blood donors. The study will utilise available testing methods and data sets to 
estimate the risk of TT-HEV in Australia and to provide additional knowledge in relation to 
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the burden of HEV in Australia. This study will also determine if current blood donation 
guidelines manage HEV risk to ensure the safety of Australian blood supply. 
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Chapter 2. Seroprevalence of Hepatitis E Virus in Australian Blood Donors and 
Implications for the Safety of the Blood Supply 
 
Context 
Hepatitis E is nationally notifiable in Australia. However, an accurate estimate of HEV 
population exposure is unknown, due to the occurrence of subclinical infection and limited 
seroprevalence studies. This chapter aims to determine if Australian blood donors have 
been exposed to HEV. This is achieved by the measurement of HEV past exposure 
through the detection of HEV IgG in blood donors. Risk factors for HEV exposure are 
assessed and data utilised to examine the effectiveness of current Australian blood safety 
strategies for the management of HEV. 
 
 
A section of this chapter has been published in the journal Emerging Infectious Diseases: 
Shrestha AC, Seed CR, Flower RL, Rooks KM, Keller AJ, Harley RJ, Chan HT, Holmberg 
JA, Faddy HM. Hepatitis E virus and implications for blood supply safety, Australia. Emerg 
Infect Dis 2014; 20: 1940-2. 
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2.1. Introduction 
HEV is an emerging public health concern for developed countries (12). In developing 
nations, epidemics occur periodically and are associated with faecal contamination of 
water (13). Although HEV in developed nations has been associated with travel to 
endemic countries, autochthonous HEV is increasingly being identified, mainly associated 
with ingestion of contaminated food or contact with infected animals (13, 248). 
Transmission through blood transfusion is also possible (17, 18). HEV can result in acute 
hepatitis, however, chronic hepatitis has been described in organ transplant and 
immunocompromised patients (249). The high rate of asymptomatic infection, together 
with documented cases of transfusion-transmission, highlights the potential risk to blood 
safety (13).  
 
In Australia, hepatitis E is nationally notifiable, averaging 25 cases per year (1999-2013 
(192). The majority of cases are associated with travel (193). However, an accurate 
estimate of HEV incidence and population exposure in Australia is unknown, due to 
subclinical infection and limited recent seroprevalence studies. HEV infection has been 
demonstrated in Australian pig herds and avian HEV has been isolated from Australian 
chicken flocks (153, 195).  
 
Detection of HEV RNA in blood donations in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan 
and China, and accumulating reports of TT-HEV, including from plasma treated with PITs, 
highlight the potential risk to transfusion safety (13, 17, 18, 250).  
 
2.2. Aims  
This chapter aimed to:  
 Measure HEV seroprevalence in Australian blood donors 
 Assess risk factors for HEV exposure 
 Examine the effectiveness of current Australian blood safety strategies for the 
management of TT-HEV 
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2.3. Materials and Methods 
2.3.1. Study Design 
This was a cross-sectional seroprevalence study based on a stratified sampling method. 
Samples were stratified based on the states/territory of residence of blood donors and 
selected randomly. Sample weighting was not used. Participants in this study were 
Australian blood donors. The sample size required was approximately 3,000, based on a 
95% confidence interval (CI), and assuming prevalence of 4% as estimated in New 
Zealand (179) (Appendix I.a). This sample population included approximately 400 samples 
from each state/territory (Figure 2.1), with random selection for sex and age groups. 
Relevant donor details were collected from the Blood Service National Blood Management 
System database. Ethical approval was received from the Blood Service Human Research 
Ethics Committee and the University of Queensland, School of Medicine Low Risk Ethical 
Review Committee (Appendix II.a, II.b). 
 
Figure 2.1: Numbers of male and female donors from each state and territory of Australia 
included in this study (ACT: Australian Capital Territory, NSW: New South Wales, NT: 
Northern territory, QLD: Queensland, SA: South Australia, TAS: Tasmania, VIC: Victoria, 
WA: Western Australia, M: Male, F: Female) 
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2.3.2. Sample Collection 
Plasma samples were collected from 3,237 Australian donors between August and 
September, 2013. Blood samples were collected in EDTA tubes (BD Vacutainer® Whole 
Blood Collection tube with spray-coated K2EDTA 6mL, Becton Dickinson, Plymouth, UK). 
Samples no longer required after routine viral screening at the Blood Service, were utilised 
for this study. All samples were stored at -200C until testing. Age, sex, state of residence, 
new/repeat donor status, and overseas travel disclosure, were obtained. Details of any 
relevant donation ‘deferral’ (malaria, diarrhoeal) applied on previous donation attempts 
were also collected. Application of a specific malaria deferral code is routine for donors 
disclosing travel to a malaria endemic country, and a diarrhoeal deferral applies where a 
donor reports having had diarrhoea (due to viral or unknown causes) one week prior to 
any attempted donation.  
 
2.3.3. Sample Testing - HEV IgG and IgM 
All samples were de-identified prior to testing. Samples were thawed at room temperature 
for 1 hour and centrifuged at 1,258 g for 5 minutes. Plasma samples were then tested in 
singlicate for HEV IgG (Wantai HEV-IgG ELISA, Beijing Wantai Biological Pharmacy 
Enterprise Co., Ltd.), as per the manufacturer’s instructions (Appendix III.a). Any samples 
testing positive were re-tested in duplicate. Samples, two or three times reactive were 
reported as seropositive (Figure 2.2). 
 
 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Algorithm for sample testing 
 
HEV IgG confirmed positive samples were tested for HEV IgM (Wantai HEV-IgM ELISA, 
Beijing Wantai Biological Pharmacy Enterprise Co., Ltd.) as per the manufacturer’s 
instructions (Appendix III.b), and results reported based on the similar algorithm as for 
HEV IgG (Figure 2.2).  
 
Sample testing was performed using Tecan Evo ELISA processor (Tecan Australia Pty 
Ltd., Port Melbourne, Victoria, Australia). Optical density was measured at 450 nm using 
Hybrid Multi-Mode Microplate Reader (Bio Tek Instruments, Inc., Winooski, USA) and 
sample/cut-off ratio (S/Co) calculated. 
 
2.3.4. Sample Testing - HEV TMA 
All HEV IgG positive samples were also tested for HEV RNA in singlicate. The samples 
were tested by TMA using Procleix HEV assay (Appendix III.d) and the Panther system 
(Hologic Inc., San Diego, CA, USA). This testing was performed at Hologic laboratories in 
San Diego. 
 
Test samples for HEV IgG (Wantai ELISA kit) 
Reactive 
Test in duplicate with same assay 
Non-reactive 
IgG Seronegative 
Reactive: 2/3, 3/3 
Test for HEV IgM (Wantai ELISA kit) 
IgG Seropositive 
Reactive: 2/3, 3/3 
 IgG and IgM Seropositive 
Test for HEV with transcription 
mediated amplification 
Non-reactive Reactive 
IgG Seropositive, IgM Seronegative 
(Singlicate) 
Reactive : 1/3 
Test in duplicate with same assay 
(Singlicate) 
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2.3.5. Statistical Analysis 
Donor demographic details and risk factors were recorded in Microsoft Excel 2010 
(Redmond, WA, USA). Data were analysed for chi-square and odds ratio measured. HEV 
seropositivity was considered as the dependent variable and risk factors independent 
variables for analyses. Logistic regression was used for factors significant in the univariate 
analyses, to determine association with HEV IgG seropositivity, using IBM SPSS Statistics 
19 (IBM Centre, NSW, Australia). 
 
2.4. Results 
In this study, 55.11% of donors were male which was slightly higher than the normal donor 
population in 2013 (49.4%) (251). The age breakdown of the sample population was 
similar to the normal donor population. 
 
Of the 3,237 blood donor samples tested, 194 tested positive for HEV IgG giving a 
seroporevalence of 5.99% (95% CI 5.18-6.81%) (see Appendix IV.a for S/Co of HEV IgG 
positive samples). The prevalence increased with age and was higher in donors of 45 
years and above (p<0.05) (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1: HEV IgG prevalence, and demographics in Australian blood donors 
Variable n tested 
HEV IgG seropositive Univariate Analysis 
N %  (95% CI) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
p 
value
Sex      
Female 1,453 78 5.37 (4.21-6.53) Reference group - 
Male 1,784 116 6.50 (5.36-7.65) 1.23 (0.91-1.65) >0.05
Age <0.05
< 25 years 564 14 2.48 (1.20-3.77) Reference group - 
25-34 years 569 13 2.28 (1.06-3.51) 0.92 (0.43-1.98) >0.05
35-44 years 510 22 4.31 (2.55-6.08) 1.77 (0.89-3.5) >0.05
45-54 years 666 40 6.01 (4.20-7.81) 2.51 (1.35-4.66) <0.05
55-64 years 673 68 10.10 (7.83-12.38) 4.41(2.46-7.94) <0.05
> 65 years 255 37 14.51 (10.19-18.83) 6.67 (3.54-12.58) <0.05
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Variable n tested 
HEV IgG seropositive Univariate Analysis 
N %  (95% CI) 
Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
p 
value
State >0.05
ACT 406 25 6.16 (3.82-8.50) Reference group - 
NSW 405 23 5.68 (3.42-7.93) 0.92 (0.51-1.64) >0.05
NT 407 26 6.39 (4.01-8.76) 1.04 (0.59-1.83) >0.05
QLD 402 18 4.48 (2.46-6.50) 0.71 (0.38-1.33) >0.05
SA 404 32 7.92 (5.29-10.55) 1.31 (0.76-2.25) >0.05
TAS 401 20 4.99 (2.86-7.12) 0.80 (0.43-1.46) >0.05
VIC 411 23 5.60 (3.37-7.82) 0.90 (0.50-1.62) >0.05
WA 401 27 6.73 (4.28-9.19) 1.10 (0.63-1.93) >0.05
 CI: confidence interval; ACT: Australian Capital Territory; NSW: New South Wales; NT: 
Northern Territory; QLD: Queensland; SA: South Australia; TAS: Tasmania; VIC: Victoria; 
WA: Western Australia 
 
Of the sample population, 87.14% (2,821) had travelled overseas and 6.38% of these 
donors were exposed to HEV. This rate was higher than in non-travellers (3.37%). HEV 
IgG prevalence was also higher in donors with a previous malaria deferral (7.73%) and 
diarrhoea deferral (15.52%) (p<0.05) (Table 2.2). The majority of samples in this study 
(90.51%) were from repeat donors (Table 2.2). Multivariate logistic regression analysis 
demonstrated only age, previous malaria deferral and previous diarrhoeal deferral were 
independent determinants of HEV IgG seropositivity (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.2: HEV IgG prevalence and other risk factors in Australian blood donors 
Variable n tested HEV IgG seropositive Univariate Analysis n % (95% CI) Odds ratio (95% CI) p value 
Overseas travel 
No 416 14 3.37 (1.63-5.10) Reference group - 
Yes 2,821 180 6.38 (5.48-7.28) 1.96 (1.12-3.40) <0.05 
Malaria deferral 
No 1,684 74 4.39 (3.42-5.37) Reference group - 
Yes 1,553 120 7.73 (6.40-9.06) 1.82 (1.35-2.45) <0.05 
Diarrhoeal deferral 
No 3,179 185 5.82 (5.01-6.63) Reference group - 
Yes 58 9 15.52 (6.20-24.84) 2.97 (1.44–6.14) <0.05 
Donor Status 
New 307 13 4.23 (1.98-6.49) Reference group - 
Repeat 2,930 181 6.18 (5.31-7.05) 1.49 (0.84-2.65) >0.05 
 
Table 2.3: Multivariate analysis of age, overseas travel, malaria and diarrhoea deferral 
and HEV IgG seropositivity 
Variable Multivariate Analysis Adjusted Odds ratio (95% CI) p value 
Age  <0.05 
< 25 years Reference group - 
25-34 years 0.82 (0.38-1.77) >0.05 
35-44 years 1.72 (0.87-3.42) >0.05 
45-54 years 2.427 (1.30-4.52) <0.05 
55-64 years 4.18 (2.32-7.54) <0.05 
> 65 years 6.09 (3.21-11.55) <0.05 
Overseas travel (Yes/No) 1.24 (0.69-2.25) >0.05 
Malaria deferral (Yes/No) 1.80 (1.3 -2.47) <0.05 
Diarrhoeal deferral (Yes/No) 2.55 (1.22-5.33) <0.05 
 
Four donors tested dual IgM/IgG positive (Table 2.4) (see Appendix IV.b for the HEV IgM 
S/Co of positive samples). The donors were of age 45 years and above. All donors had 
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travelled overseas and 3 had travelled to malaria endemic countries in the past. HEV RNA 
was not detected in any of the HEV IgG positive samples. 
 
Table 2.4: HEV IgM and IgG positive blood donors 
Donor State Age Sex Overseas travel 
Malaria 
deferral 
Diarrhoeal 
deferral 
1 NSW 60 M Yes Yes No 
2 NSW 72 M Yes No No 
3 SA 63 M Yes Yes No 
4 WA 45 F Yes Yes No 
NSW: New South Wales; SA: South Australia; WA: Western Australia; M: Male; F: Female 
 
2.5. Discussion 
In developed countries, HEV seroprevalence ranges from <5% to 53% (13, 162). In this 
study HEV IgG was demonstrated in 5.99% of Australian blood donors. Consistent with 
previous studies and as expected, an increase in IgG prevalence was observed with 
increasing age, indicating cumulative lifetime exposure (162). HEV seroprevalence among 
male and female donors were similar, indicating both the sexes were equally likely to be 
exposed to the virus. Based on concomitant detection of IgM, 2.06% of HEV IgG positive 
donors had been recently exposed. Comparing only with previous studies using Wantai 
ELISA (162, 179, 180, 184), the estimate is comparable with those reported from Scotland 
(4.7%) and New Zealand (4.2%), but lower than those from the USA (18.8%) and France 
(52.5%). There is considerable debate in relation to the sensitivity and specificity of HEV 
detection methods (13, 224); based on the studies in France and the UK, HEV 
seroprevalence in this study is measured accurately (162, 224). 
 
Of donors who reported ever traveling outside of Australia, 6.38% were HEV IgG positive. 
IgG seropositivity was also higher (7.73%) in donors who were known to have travelled to 
a malaria endemic country, many of which are also endemic for HEV (252, 253). However, 
as exposure status before departure is unknown, the exact place of exposure cannot be 
determined. 
 
Currently, management strategies to safe guard the Australian blood supply against TT- 
HEV are principally based on donor selection guidelines. In order to identify donors with 
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potential bacteremia/viremia, including HEV, a number of medical/travel-based questions 
are asked prior to donation. These include questions relating to general wellness, gastric 
upset, diarrhoea, abdominal pain or vomiting within the previous week. In addition, 
donations from donors who have travelled to malaria-risk countries are restricted to 
plasma for fractionation (which includes viral inactivation steps) for 4 months following their 
return. As many malaria endemic countries are also endemic for HEV (252, 253), this 
provides some protection against imported HEV infections. The higher HEV 
seroprevalence observed in donors with prior malaria or diarrhoeal deferral suggests some 
HEV risk reduction contribution by these screening questions. Hence, the current medical 
screening process for donor selection is likely to be effective in preventing the collection of 
HEV infected donations destined for fresh component manufacture. 
 
Importantly, a small proportion of donors (3.37%) with evidence of previous HEV exposure 
that had not reported travel outside Australia was identified, and therefore may have 
acquired HEV locally. As subclinical infection is possible, such individuals may not be 
identified by the current screening questionnaire, and may pose a risk to blood safety if 
infectious at the time of donation.  
 
Given the presence of HEV RNA in donated blood is considered the confirmatory marker 
for infectivity, some have proposed it be implemented for donor screening in HEV endemic 
countries in Europe (249). Others suggest that this is premature pending further studies, 
particularly assessing the clinical severity of TT-HEV infections (250). While it was 
encouraging that HEV RNA was not detected in the HEV IgG positive donors in this study, 
the sample size was insufficient to accurately determine the true rate of HEV RNA carriage 
among donors and a larger study was planned (Chapter 3). As noted, in addition to the 
rate of HEV viremia among donors, the clinical outcome in recipients of RNA positive 
blood components is critical when considering the need for additional risk mitigation (e.g. 
donation testing). Presently there are few data on the rate of transmission or longer-term 
clinical consequences of TT-HEV, emphasizing the need for hemovigilance. 
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2.6. Contribution of the Chapter to the Research Question 
This chapter has addressed the research question of this thesis in the following ways: 
 Demonstrated that Australian blood donors have been exposed to HEV. 
 Assessed variables such as sex, age, state of residence and frequency of blood 
donation associated with HEV previous exposure. 
 Assessed whether donor parameters (overseas travel history, deferrals for malaria 
and diarrhoea) were associated with prior HEV infection. 
 44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3. Hepatitis E Virus RNA and Antigen Detection in Australian Blood 
Donations 
 
Context 
The previous chapter (Chapter 2) showed that Australian blood donors were exposed to 
HEV. However, the risk of TT-HEV could not be measured, which required a larger sample 
size for the detection of HEV RNA. Thus, this chapter aims to estimate the risk of TT-HEV, 
achieved through measurement of the rate of current HEV infection in Australian blood 
donations based on detection of HEV RNA. The risk of collecting an infectious donation is 
determined based on the rate of HEV RNA detection.  
 
A section of this chapter has been accepted for publication in the journal Transfusion: 
Shrestha AC, Flower RL, Seed CR, Keller AJ, Harley RJ, Chan HT, Hoad V, Warrilow D, 
J Northill, Holmberg JA, Faddy HM. Hepatitis E Virus RNA in Australian blood donations. 
(Accepted: 17.07.2016) 
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3.1. Introduction 
HEV is a non-enveloped, single stranded RNA virus, in the genus Hepevirus, family 
Hepeviridae (13, 96). The four genotypes of HEV (1-4) differ in mode of transmission and 
geographical distribution (125). Genotypes 1 and 2 are transmitted by the faecal-oral route 
in developing countries due to poor water sanitation (12, 13). In developed countries, 
genotypes 3 and 4 are associated with zoonotic transmission (13, 125). These genotypes 
have also been identified in developing countries (122, 123).The occurrence of genotypes 
1 and 2 in these countries is often associated with travellers to developing countries 
endemic for HEV (254). Genotypes 3 and 4 are also known to be transmitted via blood 
transfusion (16, 17, 247). 
 
The clinical presentation of acute HEV infection is similar to that caused by other 
hepatotrophic viruses (140), and asymptomatic infections may be more common than 
symptomatic infection (13). The viremic phase begins 2-3 weeks after infection, and can 
last for 10 weeks (12, 255). Chronic HEV infection with genotypes 3 have been 
documented in solid organ transplant and blood transfusion recipients (143, 256, 257), and 
in such cases, viral RNA can persist for more than 3 months (258). HEV IgM appears after 
3-4 weeks and is detectable for 6 months, while HEV IgG is detectable 4-5 weeks post 
infection (12) and can be present for more than 12 years (12). Re-infection with HEV is 
possible, and has been described in solid organ recipients with low titre HEV IgG (259). 
 
Given that HEV infection may result in asymptomatic viraemia and that transfusion 
transmission has been documented, this virus is a subject of interest in the transfusion 
medicine community. HEV RNA has been detected in asymptomatic blood donors from the 
UK, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Scotland, Spain, Austria, the Netherlands and China 
(15, 180, 185, 187, 189, 190, 225, 255, 260). Moreover, cases of TT-HEV have been 
reported in the UK, Japan, France and Germany (17, 190, 260, 261). A study in the UK 
has demonstrated a transfusion transmission rate for HEV of 42% from infected donations 
(190). Following cases of TT-HEV, HEV NAT has been implemented in the Hokkaido 
region of Japan (260). In order to provide ‘HEV safe’ components for high risk patients, 
blood donation screening for HEV RNA has been proposed in the UK (262), and the 
Republic of Ireland (263), and has been implemented for plasma pools in France (264). 
Donations used for the production of solvent/detergent-treated plasma are also screened 
for HEV RNA in the Netherlands with an in-house real time RT-PCR (255). Non-enveloped 
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viruses, like HEV, may be resistant to many pathogen inactivation methods. Indeed, HEV 
has been transmitted to a recipient from infected plasma after treatment with the Intercept 
system (synthetic psoralen amotosalen HCL treatment and ultraviolet light A) (18). Given 
that HEV infection in immunocompromised individuals, such as many transfusion 
recipients, can lead to chronic infection (258), it is essential to assess HEV risk to blood 
supply safety.  
 
In Australia, hepatitis E is a notifiable disease, with an average of 25 cases annually (15). 
The majority of diagnosed cases are acquired overseas in South Asian countries, with a 
smaller proportion of autochthonous cases (265). In 2014, there was an outbreak of HEV 
genotype 3 in northern Sydney, associated with the consumption of undercooked pork 
(201). HEV IgG prevalence was 5.99% in a cohort of Australian blood donors (266). 
Although HEV IgM was reported in 2.06% of the IgG seropositive donors, no HEV RNA 
was detected (266). To date, there have been no published case reports of TT-HEV in 
Australia. A case of HEV genotype 3, thought to be associated with transfusion was 
reported, but there was insufficient evidence to determine the mode of transmission (83).  
 
In Australia, HEV risk to blood supply safety is managed through routine medical history 
examination and travel history questionnaire. Individuals with a current HEV infection are 
excluded from donating for 12 months from the date of their recovery (71). In the case of 
post donation notification of an HEV infection by a donor, blood components, where 
available, collected 2 months prior to a donor becoming ill are recalled (71). Donors in 
sexual/mucosal contact with an HEV infected person are also deferred from donation (71). 
The current policy of deferring donations from donors returning from travel to countries 
endemic for malaria is also likely to reduce the risk of TT-HEV as such donors are 
excluded from donating fresh components for 4 months following their travel (71). Indeed, 
94% of HEV notifications in Australia were acquired in countries covered by such a travel 
deferral policy (265). Despite these strategies, there is still a need to assess whether HEV 
poses a risk to the safety of the Australian blood supply based on the detection of markers 
of current HEV infection in Australian blood donations. 
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3.2. Aims  
This chapter aimed to: 
 Determine the risk of collecting an HEV infectious donation  
 Determine rate of HEV antigen prevalence 
 
3.3.  Materials and Methods 
3.3.1. Study Population 
This was a cross sectional study based on stratified sampling method. Samples from blood 
donations were collected from Australian blood donors between September and October, 
2014. A total of 14,799 samples were included in this study, based on a sample size 
calculation assuming a similar rate of HEV RNA detection to that observed in Japanese 
blood donors (0.012%) (188), and with an absolute precision of 0.009% (Appendix I. b). 
Samples were collected from the Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney processing 
centres to represent cross-sectional Australian blood donations (see Appendix V.a for 
breakdown of sample numbers by collection centre). Ethical approval for this study was 
obtained from the Blood Service Human Research Ethics Committee and the University of 
Queensland Human Research Ethics Committee (Appendix II.a, II.b). 
 
3.3.2. Sample Collection 
Samples were collected in EDTA tubes (BD Vacutainer® Whole Blood Collection tube with 
spray-coated K2EDTA 6mL, Becton Dickinson, Plymouth, UK) then centrifuged at 1,258 g 
for 5 minutes as per routine procedures. Samples were recovered after routine screening 
for infectious diseases was complete. Samples were made available for this study and the 
plasma aliquoted into 5 ml Corning® Cryogenic Vials (Corning Incorporated, New York, 
USA). All samples were de-identified and a given unique study number. Samples were 
processed and stored at -200C until required. 
 
3.3.3. HEV RNA Testing - Transcription Mediated Amplification 
All samples were tested for HEV RNA by TMA (Figure 3.1). Plasma samples were tested 
with a research use only Procleix HEV assay on the Procleix Panther System (Grifols 
Diagnostic Solutions, Inc., Emeryville, CA, USA) as per the manufacturer’s instructions 
(Appendix III.d), which included positive, negative and internal controls. The Procleix HEV 
assay can detect all four genotypes of HEV (189). The 95% limit of detection is reported to 
be 7.89 IU/ml (95% fiducial limits 6.63-9.83 IU/ml), with a specificity of 99.99% (95% CI, 
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99.94%-100.00%) (189). Samples testing initially reactive and with adequate volume were 
retested with the same assay. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Algorithm for sample testing  
 
3.3.4. HEV RNA Testing - RT-PCR 
All HEV TMA initial reactive samples were tested for HEV RNA by RT-PCR (Figure 3.1). 
Viral RNA was extracted from each sample (140 µl) using QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit 
(Chadstone, Victoria, Australia) (Appendix III.e). An internal control (IC) from the RT-PCR 
kit described below was added to the lysis buffer during RNA extraction. RNA (25 µl) was 
tested in duplicate with the Realstar HEV RT-PCR kit 1.0 (Altona Diagnostics, Hamburg, 
Germany) using the Rotor-Gene 6000 (QIAGEN, Don Caster, Victoria, Australia) as per 
the manufacturer’s instructions (Appendix III.f), which included positive and negative 
controls. The following conditions were used: 500C for 10 minutes, 950C for 10 minutes, 
then 45 cycles of: 950C for 15 seconds, 550C for 45 seconds and 720C for 15 seconds. 
Samples testing positive in duplicate were referred to as HEV RNA positive (Figure 3.1). 
The 95% limit of detection of the HEV RT-PCR assay is reported to range from 20 IU/ml to 
100 IU/ml for individual sample testing (240, 267). The assay targets HEV ORF3, and has 
been shown to detect all HEV genotype 3 subtypes (267).  
 
Samples 
HEV antigen HEV RNA 
Reactive: 2/3, 3/3 
Test in duplicate with same assay 
HEV antigen positive 
Reactive: 1/3 Test in singlicate with TMA 
Test in duplicate with RT PCR 
HEV TMA positive 
HEV RNA positive 
Reactive: 2/2 Reactive: 1/2 
Test in singlicate with same assay 
Negative 
Negative 
Reactive: 
2/3 
Reactive: 1/3 
Genotyping 
HEV IgG and IgM 
 testing 
(Testing strategy as 
for HEV antigen) Viral load 
quantification 
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3.3.5. HEV Antigen Testing 
All samples were also tested for HEV antigen (Figure 3.1) with the Wantai HEV-Ag ELISA 
Plus (Beijing Wantai Biological Pharmacy Enterprise Co., Ltd, China) as per the 
manufacturer’s instructions (Appendix III.c), which included positive and negative controls. 
The assay is based on a monoclonal antibody against HEV ORF2 and can detect capsid 
protein of genotypes 1 and 4 within the window period and for 3-4 weeks post-infection 
(230, 240). According to the manufacturer, the specificity of the assay was 99.93% and 
positive agreement with PCR was 66.70% (268). Absorbance was measured using Hybrid 
Multi-Mode Microplate Reader (Bio Tek Instruments, Inc., Winooski, United States) at 450 
nm and sample to cut-off ratio was calculated (Appendix IV.c). Initially reactive samples 
were re-tested in duplicate with the same assay, and considered positive if reactive at 
least twice (Figure 3.1). 
 
3.3.6. HEV IgG and IgM Testing 
HEV antigen positive or RNA positive samples were tested for HEV IgG with the Wantai 
HEV IgG ELISA (Beijing Wantai Biological Pharmacy) and for HEV IgM, with the Wantai 
HEV IgM ELISA (Beijing Wantai Biological Pharmacy), as per the manufacturer’s 
instructions (Appendix III.a, III.b). Positive and negative controls were always included 
when performing an assay. The IgG assay uses a recombinant HEV PE2 protein derived 
from HEV genotype 1, and has been shown to detect antibodies against genotype 3 (223, 
224). The IgM assay uses a recombinant protein derived from HEV ORF2 (specific details 
not disclosed) (269). According to the manufacturer, the sensitivity of the HEV IgG assay 
was 97.96%, while the HEV IgM assay was 97.10% (270, 271). Samples initially reactive 
for HEV IgG or HEV IgM were re-tested in duplicate with the same assay, and considered 
positive if reactive at least twice. 
 
3.3.7. Viral Load Measurement 
For samples confirmed HEV RNA positive, HEV quantification was performed in duplicate 
with 10-fold serial dilutions of the WHO International Standard for HEV (Paul-Ehrlich-
Institut, Germany) using the RT-PCR conditions described above. HEV viral load in the 
RNA positive sample was measured in IU/ml by comparing the Ct value of the sample with 
the obtained standard curve (Appendix VI.a).  
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3.3.8. Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analyses 
For samples confirmed HEV RNA positive, RT-PCR targeting the HEV methyltransferase 
and ORF2/3 regions was performed (272), and the PCR products were sequenced. A 
phylogenetic tree was constructed on a nucleotide sequence alignment with other HEV 
GenBank submissions. Evolutionary analyses were conducted in MEGA5 (273), using the 
Maximum Likelihood method based on the Tamura-Nei model and performing 1000 
bootstrap replicates. Sequencing and phylogenetic analyses were performed by D. 
Warrilow and J. Northill at the Public Health Virology Laboratory, Queensland Health, 
Australia. 
 
3.3.9. Statistical Analysis 
Data analysis was performed using Microsoft Excel 2010 (Redmond, WA, USA). Exact CI 
were calculated for individual proportions (HEV RNA positivity) using a standard method 
(274).  
 
3.4. Results 
Of the 14,799 samples tested, 9 were TMA initial reactive; 8 of these were negative on 
repeat testing, and one could not be re-tested due to inadequate sample volume (Table 
3.1). The 8 samples that were negative on repeat testing also tested negative by RT-PCR 
and were negative for HEV antigen. However, the sample that was initially TMA reactive, 
but could not be TMA re-tested, was confirmed positive by RT-PCR (Figure 3.2). This 
sample was also HEV antigen positive, however, was negative for HEV IgG and IgM. This 
gave a rate of HEV RNA of 0.0068% (95% CI: 0.0002 - 0.0376%), and resulted in a risk of 
collecting an HEV viraemic donation of 1 in 14,799 Australian blood donations (95% CI: 1 
in 2,657 to 1 in 584,530). Of the total sample tested, 52 were positive for HEV antigen 
(0.35%, 95% CI 0.26-0.45%) (Appendix IV.c for S/Co of HEV antigen positive samples, 
Appendix V.b ).  
 
The viral load in the confirmed HEV RNA positive sample was estimated to be 15,000 
IU/ml (Appendix VI.a). Phylogenetic analysis revealed that this sample (ARCBS 2015) was 
most closely related to genotype 3 isolates from Japan, Canada, Germany and USA 
(Figure 3.3). Next generation sequencing performed on the sample generated a 890 nt 
fragment, which gave a best match to HEV genotype 3 by Blastn (87% identity) (Appendix 
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VI.b), confirming the phylogenetic analysis. Together these observations indicate the 
isolate was genotype 3. 
 
 Table 3.1: HEV RNA detection in Australian blood donations 
Sample   HEV antigen HEV TMA 
initial 
HEV TMA 
repeat 
HEV RT-
PCR 
1  - + - - 
2  + + NT + 
3  - + - - 
4  - + - - 
5  - + - - 
6  - + - - 
7  - + - - 
8  - + - - 
9  - + - - 
- : Negative; + : Positive; NT: Not tested due to inadequate volume 
 
 
Figure 3.2: PCR amplification curves for controls and HEV RNA positive sample 
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Figure 3.3: Phylogenetic analysis, based on MTase ORF1 (A) or ORF2/3 (B) of different 
HEV strains, including the HEV RNA positive sample identified in this study (ARCBS 2015) 
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3.5. Discussion 
The detection of HEV RNA in asymptomatic blood donors and the demonstration of TT-
HEV in immunocompromised individuals have resulted in HEV being the subject of much 
debate in the international transfusion community (14). In Australia, 5.99% of blood donors 
have been previously exposed to HEV (266). Although existing donation restrictions 
prevent many at-risk donors from donating (265), the residual risk of collecting an HEV 
infected donation remained to be investigated. The present study provided evidence of 
HEV RNA in Australian blood donations, which indicated a potential threat to blood supply 
safety. 
 
In this study, the risk of collecting an HEV infected donation (based on detection of HEV 
RNA) was 1 in 14,799 donations (95% CI: 1 in 2,657 to 1 in 584,530). This rate of HEV 
RNA detection is similar to that reported in Scotland (1 in 14,520 individual donations) 
(180), however, it is lower than in other developed countries, including the UK (1 in 2,848 
donors) (190), Spain (1 in 3,333 donations) (189), the Netherlands (1 in 1,322 donations) 
(275), Germany (1 in 1,240 donors) (187), Japan (1 in 8,658 donors) (188), USA (1 in 
9,500) (191), and China (1 in 1,494 donors) (167). This reflects the HEV seroprevalence in 
these countries (108, 167, 169, 178, 180, 189), and is also consistent with the 
considerably lower HEV case notification data in Australia (265). However, notification 
data represent symptomatic cases, which are notified to a health authority following the 
patient seeking health care and confirmation of diagnosis (276), whereas RNA detection in 
blood donors is likely to represent asymptomatic cases. Despite these differences, both 
the rates of asymptomatic and symptomatic HEV in Australia are estimated to be low (15, 
265). Further clinical studies exploring HEV in non-travellers with acute hepatitis in 
Australia could possibly provide additional evidence on disease burden.  
 
The viral load in the HEV RNA positive sample was estimated to be 15,000 IU/ml. This 
was within the range reported among Dutch (less than 25 IU/ml to greater than 100,000 
IU/ml) (178), Swedish (1,660-478,630 IU/ml) and German blood donors (1,820-223,872 
IU/ml) (277), but higher than reported in a blood donor from the USA (14 IU/ml) (191). Viral 
loads ranging between 407 IU/ml and 257,039 IU/ml in blood donations have been 
associated with TT-HEV (190). This same study also demonstrated that only 42% of 
recipients were infected with HEV after transfusion from infected donations, with no 
association with viral load observed (190). In this study, the risk of transfusion 
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transmission from the HEV RNA positive donation could not be determined as this was a 
delinked study, so neither the donor nor the recipient were identified.  
 
The HEV RNA positive sample was determined to be genotype 3. As HEV genotype 3 is 
predominately transmitted through the consumption of undercooked infected pork (12), this 
indicates the infected donor was likely to have acquired the infection through zoonotic 
transmission. The donor could have acquired HEV infection locally in Australia; indeed, the 
majority of autochthonous HEV in Australia are genotype 3 (83, 201). Alternatively, the 
donor may have been infected overseas in a developed country, where HEV genotypes 3 
are commonly reported (125, 128). Given the majority of HEV infections with genotype 3 
are asymptomatic (67-98%) (140), current infection of a blood donor, who must be well at 
the time of donation, is plausible. 
 
Surprisingly, HEV antigen prevalence (0.35%) in Australian blood donors was higher than 
those reported in China (0.06%) (225), an endemic country with higher HEV RNA 
prevalence. With limited studies on HEV antigen prevalence and only one commercially 
available assay; interpretation of such differences is challenging. One of the samples 
testing positive by TMA and RT-PCR was also HEV antigen positive; however, all other 
antigen positive samples were negative for HEV RNA. This indicates a poor agreement 
between HEV antigen and RNA, which could be due to these markers occurring at 
different stages of infection, or non-specificity in the HEV antigen assay. Only a few 
studies have reported the use of HEV antigen assay as an alternative for HEV RNA 
detection (278, 279). A study in the Chinese blood donor population demonstrated non-
concordance between antigen and RNA positivity (50% of HEV antigen positive being 
RNA positive), a study in German blood donors has revealed HEV antigen in 40% of HEV 
RNA positive samples (225, 240). Since the majority of HEV antigen positive samples 
(98%) were negative for HEV RNA and/or antibodies in this study, this could be due to 
false positive results with the antigen assay. With only one HEV antigen commercial assay 
available and one sample positive for HEV RNA obtained from this study, assay 
performance could not be determined. 
 
Blood transfusion is one of the possible routes of HEV transmission (108), and the virus is 
known to cause acute and chronic hepatitis, especially in immunocompromised individuals 
(257). Given that the majority of HEV cases are asymptomatic and unexpectedly high 
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prevalence of asymptomatic viraemia has been detected in blood donors internationally 
(189, 190), screening of blood donations for HEV is widely debated in the transfusion 
community (14). This study provides inaugural data on HEV RNA prevalence in Australian 
blood donations. The rate of detection of HEV RNA (1 in 14,799 donations) in Australian 
blood donations appears to be lower than in many other developed countries, however, 
given the wide confidence intervals and lack of data on donation types, there is a need for 
future studies to more precisely evaluate the risk posed by this virus. HEV transmission 
may fluctuate in both human and animal reservoirs and novel genetic variants may emerge 
(280); the implications for transfusion safety are yet to be understood. 
 
3.6. Contribution of the Chapter to the Research Question 
This chapter has addressed the research question of this thesis in the following ways: 
 Demonstrated Australian blood donors were infected with HEV. 
 Estimated the risk of collecting HEV infectious donation based on the rate of HEV 
RNA detection in blood donations. 
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Chapter 4. Overseas-Acquired Hepatitis E Virus in Australia and Assessing the 
Threat to Blood Supply Safety 
 
Context 
The preceding chapters (Chapters 2 and Chapter 3) measured previous and current HEV 
exposure in Australian blood donations respectively. Further studies are required to 
assess whether current Australian donor guidelines manage any TT-HEV risk. This 
chapter therefore aims to determine if existing Blood Service travel deferral policies assist 
with minimising the risk of TT-HEV from imported HEV infections. Trends in notified cases 
of HEV in Australia are analysed based on demographic details and place of acquisition. 
Countries considered at higher risk for HEV exposure are identified and the rate of 
importation estimated based on travel data. The study provides evidence in relation to 
whether existing Blood Service travel-related exclusion policy for malaria manages the 
potential risk of TT-HEV from travellers. 
 
This chapter has been published in the journal Blood Transfusion: 
Shrestha AC, Flower RL, Seed CR, Keller AJ, Hoad V, Harley R, Leader R, Polkinghorne 
B, Furlong C, Faddy HM. Hepatitis E Virus Infections in Travellers: Assessing the Threat to 
the Australian Blood Supply. Blood Transfus 2016; DOI 10.2450/2016.0064-16 
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4.1. Introduction 
HEV is a cause of acute hepatitis (190), associated with large outbreaks in developing 
countries resulting from faecal-oral transmission (12). In some developed countries, the 
majority of cases are associated with travellers returning from countries endemic for HEV 
(12, 108, 125). Autochthonous HEV infection transmitted via the consumption of 
undercooked contaminated meat or contact with infected animals, has recently emerged 
as a major transmission route in developed countries (140, 281, 282). Other modes of 
transmission include congenital transmission, as well as transmission through infected 
organs or blood (108, 283), which has led to HEV gaining the attention of the transfusion 
medicine community. 
 
HEV is a single stranded positive sense RNA virus. The virus is the only genus of the 
Hepeviridae family (13, 96). There are four known genotypes (HEV 1, 2, 3 and 4) infecting 
humans, subdivided into 24 sub-genotypes (13, 128), which represent a common serotype 
(12). The genotypes vary in geographical distribution and mode of transmission (284). 
Genotype 1 has been reported in Asia and Africa while genotype 2 has been reported in 
Mexico, Nigeria and Chad (12). Both these genotypes infect humans only. Genotypes 3 
and 4 infect humans and animals and are seen in Europe, and South-east Asia (108). HEV 
genotype 3 has recently been reported in the USA (285). HEV genotype 4 has been 
reported in Japan and China (12). The transmission route of genotypes 1 and 2 is faecal-
oral, while genotypes 3 and 4 are predominantly transmitted via contact with infected 
animals or through the consumption of undercooked infected meat (primarily pork, but also 
deer and wild-boar) (108, 125, 286). 
 
In 2005, it was estimated that there were 20.1 million incident HEV genotypes 1 and 2 
infections globally, resulting in 3.4 million symptomatic cases, 70,000 deaths and 3,000 
still births (161). In developing countries, the rate of mortality in pregnant women can be 
up to 25% (12). The majority of HEV infections are asymptomatic, however, there are 
differences in asymptomatic rates between developing countries (where up to 50% of 
cases can be asymptomatic) where genotypes 1 and 2 predominate and developed 
countries (where the asymptomatic rate can be 67-98%) where genotypes 3 and 4 
predominate (140). This may be due to the infecting genotype, or the underlying health of 
the population. Symptomatic infection with HEV is similar to infection with other hepatitis 
viruses, including anorexia, vomiting, jaundice and hepatomegaly (12). Chronic HEV 
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infections, due to genotypes 3 and 4, with a viraemic phase of more than three months, 
have been reported in solid organ transplant recipients and in patients with 
immunosuppressive disorders (143). 
 
Hepatitis E is nationally notifiable in Australia (287). HEV seroprevalence was estimated to 
be 5.99% among Australian blood donors, with a higher prevalence in donors reporting 
overseas travels (6.38%) compared to donors who had not travelled overseas (3.37%) 
(266). HEV cases have been associated with travel to countries endemic for HEV, 
including India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Thailand (193). Locally-acquired HEV infections 
are also reported in Australia, albeit more rarely. 24 HEV cases were reported from 
October 2013 to June 2014, from the state of NSW, all with no recent overseas travel 
history and all linked to the consumption of undercooked infected pork (201). 18 of these 
cases were associated with an outbreak from a single restaurant (201). Recently a case of 
locally-acquired HEV was reported in a liver transplant recipient who had also received a 
blood transfusion (83). There was insufficient evidence to elucidate the exact route of 
transmission, however, it was postulated to include contaminated food or transfusion-
transmission (83). 
 
There has been increasing concern in relation to HEV within the transfusion community, 
due to the high proportion of asymptomatic infections. HEV RNA has been detected in 
blood donors in the UK, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Scotland (13, 190). 
Moreover, TT-HEV has been reported in the UK, Japan and France (17, 156, 190), leading 
to symptomatic disease in some transfusion recipients (17, 109). HEV has also been 
transmitted via plasma treated with a PIT, which demonstrates resistance of the virus to 
that type of PIT (18). 
 
To date there are no published case reports of TT-HEV in Australia. Blood donations are 
currently not screened for markers of HEV infection in Australia, however, such testing has 
been proposed in France and the UK (14, 262), and has been implemented in the 
Hokkaido region of northern Japan (14, 260). Given the risk for TT-HEV, the Blood Service 
manages this risk through medical and travel history examination via a mandatory pre-
donation history questionnaire. This results in the total exclusion of individuals diagnosed 
with an HEV infection for 12 months from the date of recovery (71). Moreover, in instances 
where a donor notifies the Blood Service of an infection post donation, fresh components 
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(red blood cells, platelets and fresh frozen plasma) are recalled for up to two months prior 
to the date of the donor becoming ill (71). Potential donors are also deferred from all types 
of blood donation if they have had household or sexual/mucosal contact with an infected 
person (71). Donors are also excluded from donating fresh components for a minimum of 
120 days after travel to countries endemic for malaria and until the donation tests negative 
on malarial antibody screening (71). This travel deferral may prevent the risk of collecting 
an HEV infectious donation as many of these countries are also endemic for HEV. 
 
4.2. Aims 
This chapter aimed to: 
 Describe overseas-acquired HEV cases notified in Australia in order to determine 
whether infection in travellers poses a risk to Australian blood supply safety 
 Provide evidence in relation to whether the existing Blood Service travel-related 
exclusion policy for malaria manages the potential risk of TT-HEV from travellers  
 
4.3. Materials and Methods 
4.3.1. HEV Surveillance System in Australia 
Hepatitis E is classified as a gastrointestinal disease and there is a requirement for all 
cases to be notified to state and territory health departments under their public health 
legislation. States and territories forward de-identified notification data to the Australian 
Government Department of Health’s National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System 
(NNDSS) (276). Only confirmed cases of HEV are notified, and HEV has been nationally 
notifiable since 1999. Cases therefore represent only those for which healthcare was 
sought by the patient, a test conducted, diagnosis made and confirmed, followed by 
notification to a health authority.  
 
4.3.2. Case Definition 
A confirmed case of HEV infection refers to one confirmed by laboratory definitive 
evidence. During the period of this study, the evidence was based on detection of: HEV 
RNA by NAT; virus by electron microscopy; IgG seroconversion; or a four-fold or greater 
rise in antibody titre to HEV (287). A case was also considered to be confirmed if 
laboratory suggestive evidence (detection of HEV IgG or IgM) was supported by clinical 
evidence (a clinically compatible illness) and epidemiological evidence (travel to an HEV 
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endemic country 15-64 days prior to the onset of disease or an epidemiological link to 
confirmed case) (287).  
 
4.3.3. HEV Cases 
Details of all HEV cases notified to public health authorities based on diagnosis date 
between 2002 and 2014 inclusive were extracted from the NNDSS. These data included 
diagnosis date, age, sex, state/territory of residence, and country of acquisition. The age of 
an individual was as reported to the health authority or calculated at onset, using the 
difference between date of birth and diagnosis date. Place of acquisition was usually 
obtained through public health follow-up.  
 
4.3.4. Overseas Travel Data 
The number of short term resident returns and visitor arrivals in Australia were accessed 
from the Australian Government Department of Immigration and Border Protection website 
(288). Visitor arrivals were included in this analysis because all hepatitis E infections 
diagnosed in Australia are notified to NNDSS, including international visitors. Also, 
providing all other donation requirements are met, international visitors are able to donate 
in Australia, although this group likely represents a small proportion of total donations. 
These data were obtained from July 2004 to December 2014 for countries of relevance. 
The source of Overseas Arrival and Departure (OAD) data (arrival and departure data for 
Australian residents or overseas visitors, through Australian airports and seaports) was 
incoming and outgoing passenger cards, which were matched with data from passports 
and visas (289). OAD data describes the number of movements of travellers rather than 
the number of travellers (288).  
 
4.3.5. Data Analysis 
Firstly, HEV cases in Australia were separated based on place of acquisition (local, 
overseas, and unknown). As this study focused on HEV cases in Australia acquired 
overseas, only overseas-acquired infections were included in subsequent analyses. These 
cases were then described by age, sex, year and seasonality of acquisition, as well as 
country of acquisition. The estimated HEV importation rate was then determined for 
countries with five or more cases of overseas-acquired HEV, based on the number of 
people in Australia who had recently (within 1 year) travelled to such countries. Short term 
movement information was used rather than long term movement to capture recent travel 
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and to minimize inaccuracies due to travel to multiple countries (more likely with longer 
travel). Short term movements refer to movements within one year, which includes short 
term resident departure, short term resident return (STRR), short term visitor departure 
and short term visitor arrivals (STVA) (289). STRR data were used to capture travel of 
Australian residents, while STVA data used for travelling non-residents. The number of 
people (STRR and STVA) arriving in Australia following travel to countries where five or 
more HEV cases were acquired during the study period were calculated. Importation rates 
over the study period were calculated per 10,000 persons. Countries with overseas-
acquired HEV were then compared to those where donations are restricted for travel due 
to malaria-risk as per the Blood Service guidelines for selection of blood donors. Only 
individuals between the ages 15-69 years, representing those who are eligible to donate 
blood in Australia, were included in this analysis. 
 
4.3.6. Ethical Approval 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from ACT Health Human Research Ethics 
Committee, the University of Queensland School of Medicine Low Risk Ethical Review 
Committee and the Blood Service Human Research Ethics Committee (Appendix II.a, II.c. 
II.d). 
 
4.4. Results 
During the study period, there were 400 cases of HEV notified to Australian health 
authorities. Of these, 332 cases (83%) were acquired overseas, with 41 (10%) locally-
acquired and 27 (7%) cases with an unknown country of acquisition (Table 4.1). Only 
those cases confirmed to be acquired overseas were included in subsequent analyses. No 
individual had more than one country of acquisition listed.  
 
The highest number (13%) of overseas-acquired HEV cases occurred in 2008, however, 
trends by year were non uniform and no seasonality was observed (Figure 4.1). 65% of 
overseas-acquired HEV infections were in males, and 22% of cases were in individuals 
aged 25-29 years (Figure 4.2). Individuals residing in the state of NSW represented 40% 
of overseas-acquired HEV, with 32% from Victoria, 13% from Queensland and 13% from 
the remaining states/territories (Table 4.2).  
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Table 4.1: Acquisition of HEV cases notified in Australia between 2002 and 2014: Local or 
Overseas 
Year Acquisition of HEV Overseas Local Unknown 
2002 6 0 5 
2003 7 2 3 
2004 25 1 2 
2005 29 1 0 
2006 22 1 1 
2007 16 1 1 
2008 42 2 0 
2009 30 2 1 
2010 33 2 2 
2011 35 3 3 
2012 31 0 1 
2013 27 5 2 
2014 29 21 6 
Total 332 41 27 
 
Travel to India accounted for 48% of overseas-acquired HEV infections, followed by travel 
to Bangladesh (12%), Nepal (7%) and Pakistan (4%) (Table 4.2). Based on the number of 
travellers arriving into Australia, the risk of HEV acquisition was highest for travel to Nepal 
(18 per 10,000 arriving travellers), and Bangladesh (17 cases per 10,000 travellers) 
followed by Sudan (14 cases per 10,000 travellers) and Pakistan (5 per 10,000 travellers) 
(Table 4.3). 
 
All these ‘higher-risk’ countries are also endemic for malaria (252); blood donors returning 
from these countries are unable to donate fresh components for 4 months following their 
return. Moreover, countries where donations are restricted following travel due to malaria-
risk accounted for 94% (298/316) of overseas-acquired HEV cases, within the age range 
eligible to donate blood in Australia.  
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Figure 4.1: Overseas-acquired HEV cases notified in Australia between 2002 and 2014, 
by month and year (Data Source: Australian Government Department of Health, 
Communicable Diseases Network Australia) 
 
Figure 4.2: Overseas-acquired HEV cases notified in Australia between 2002 and 2014, 
by age group and sex (Data Source: Australian Government Department of Health, 
Communicable Diseases Network Australia) 
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Table 4.2: Country of acquisiton of overseas-acquired HEV cases notified in Australia between 2002 and 2014 
Country State of residence  Total ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA Unknown 
India 6 58 0 17 0 1 66 11 1 160 (48.19%) 
Bangladesh 2 24 0 2 0 0 10 2 0 40 (12.05%) 
Nepal 1 12 0 1 0 0 6 0 2 22 (6.63%) 
Pakistan 2 7 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 14 (4.22%) 
Chinaa 0 7 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 14 (4.22%) 
Thailand 0 4 0 1 0 0 3 4 0 12 (3.61%) 
Vietnam 0 2 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 9 (2.71%) 
Indonesia 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 7 (2.10%) 
Sudan 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 5 (1.51%) 
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Country State of residence Total ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA Unknown 
Hong Kong 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5 (1.51%) 
Papua New Guinea 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 (1%) 
Timor-Leste 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 (1%) 
Other Countriesb 2 9 0 12 0 2 7 4 2 38 (11.45%) 
Total 13 (3.92%) 
133 
(40.06%) 
3 
(1.00%) 
43 
(12.95%) 0 
3 
(1.00%)
107 
(32.23%) 
24 
(7.23%) 
6 
(1.81%) 332 
aExcludes SARS (Special Administrative Regions) and Taiwan. 
bOther Countries: Afghanistan (n=1), The Americas (n=1), Cambodia (n=2), Chinese Asia (includes Mongolia; n=1), Egypt (n=1), Greece 
(n=2), Iran (n=2), Italy (n=1), Mainland South East-Asia (n=1), Malaysia (n=2), Mozambique (n=1), Namibia (n=1), North Africa (n=1), 
North-East Asia (n=1), Peru (n=1), The Philippines (n=2), Singapore (n=3), South-East Asia (n=2), Southern Asia (n=1), Sri-Lanka (n=2), 
Turkey (n=1), United Arab Emirates (n=1), United Kingdom Channel Islands and Isle of Man (n=1), other unknown countries (n=6). 
 ACT: Australian Capital Territory, NSW: New South Wales, NT: Northern Territory, QLD: Queensland, SA: South Australian, TAS: 
Tasmania, VIC: Victoria, WA: Western Australia 
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Table 4.3: HEV importation rate per 10,000 travellers, July 2004-December 2014, by 
country of acquisition 
Country Number of 
imported cases 
Total travellers HEV importation 
rate 
Bangladesh 40 23,227 17.22 
Chinaa 14 5,742,036 0.02 
India 160 527,244 3.03 
Indonesia 6 7,295,352 0.01 
Nepal  22 12,404 17.74 
Pakistan 14 28,226 4.96 
Sudan 5 3,652 13.69 
Thailand 12 6,320,903 0.02 
Vietnam 9 1,264,056 0.07 
*Excludes SARS (Special Administrative Regions) and Taiwan 
 
4.5. Discussion 
Due to accumulating reports of TT-HEV, this agent has gained the attention of the 
transfusion medicine community globally. In Australia, diagnosed autochthonous HEV is 
rare, with the majority of infections in overseas travellers. Indeed, it has been previously 
shown that 6.4% of Australian blood donors who had travelled overseas were previously 
exposed to HEV (266). The present study demonstrates that the majority of notified 
overseas-acquired HEV infections in Australia were in travellers returning from South Asia, 
namely India, Bangladesh and Nepal. These countries are endemic for HEV, where large 
water-borne outbreaks occur seasonally (13, 148, 243, 290). Thus, there is a potential risk 
to blood safety in Australia from donors after their return from such countries. However, 
the majority of HEV importations were acquired from countries where donation-related 
travel restrictions for malaria exist, demonstrating that existing Blood Service travel 
deferral policies assist with minimising the risk to fresh components from imported HEV 
infections. 
 
Despite seasonal HEV outbreaks occurring in developing countries (140), no seasonality 
was observed in HEV cases in Australian travellers during the study period. Possible 
reasons for this could be due to ill travellers being diagnosed overseas, a lag between 
infection and notification in Australia, or be masked by under reporting given the high 
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asymptomatic rate. The number of travellers to endemic countries during seasonal 
outbreaks may influence cases diagnosed in Australia. However, data on travel period was 
not included in these analyses. In many developed countries, where HEV genotypes 3 and 
4 occur, elderly males are predominantly affected (125). In this study, higher numbers of 
cases were among males and in younger aged individuals. This could be due to the 
different genotypes present in South Asian countries (13), which account for the majority of 
notified overseas-acquired HEV cases in Australia. The demographics of Australian 
travellers and/or food habits of younger travellers could also explain this. 
 
Where known, the countries of acquisition of all cases in this study are endemic for HEV, 
with the majority in Asia and Africa categorised highly endemic and those in Europe 
(including UK, France) and America endemic (291). Specifically, 83% of overseas-
acquired cases notified were acquired in India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Sudan, 
China (excluding SARs and Taiwan), Vietnam or Thailand. The year with the highest 
number of imported HEV cases was 2008; this may be linked to outbreaks of HEV in these 
countries. Indeed, in 2008 there were notable outbreaks for HEV in Bangladesh and India 
(243, 292). Despite the highest number of cases being from India, the rate of HEV 
importation was higher from Nepal, Bangladesh, Sudan and Pakistan, due to the large 
numbers of travellers to India and smaller numbers to Nepal, Bangladesh, Sudan and 
Pakistan. Therefore, both the number of cases and number of travellers returning from 
respective countries should be considered when determining which countries are ‘at-risk’. 
One of the limitations of this study is that OAD data represents number of movements 
rather than number of travellers; however, in the absence of data in relation to the latter, 
OAD estimates were used to approximate the rate of HEV importation.  
 
HEV is transfusion-transmissible and hence importations of HEV into Australia have the 
potential to pose a risk to the safety of the Australian blood supply. Current strategies to 
mitigate the risk of TT-HEV include a medical and travel history examination and donor 
questionnaire. Symptomatic cases of HEV are managed by deferring potential donors from 
donating for 12 months from the date of recovery, however they may escape if in the 
incubation period (71). However, given cases are viraemic before the onset of symptoms 
and the majority of cases are asymptomatic, this strategy only has limited effectiveness in 
mitigating the risk.  
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The Blood Service guidelines for selection of blood donors list countries ‘at-risk’ for various 
infectious diseases to ensure transfusion safety. Travel risk is assessed via a 
questionnaire that asks whether a donor has travelled overseas in the past three years. In 
this study, 94% of notified overseas-acquired HEV cases were acquired from countries 
where donors are currently restricted from donating fresh components for 4 months after 
leaving such countries, due to risk of malaria (71). Countries not covered by malaria 
restrictions include the Americas (n=1), Greece (n=2), Hong Kong (n=5), Singapore (n=3), 
United Arab Emirates (n=1), and the UK, Channel Islands and Isle of Man (n=1), however, 
based on these very small numbers, travel to such countries is unlikely to pose a 
significant risk to transfusion safety in Australia. The typical length of HEV viremia of four 
to six weeks in most individuals (12) has recently been challenged in a study of 
asymptomatic viremic Dutch blood donors (255), where the authors estimated the mean 
duration of viremia to be 68 days. However, this calculation excluded donors with a shorter 
period of viremia whom the length could not be calculated, and repeat testing documented 
very low viral loads at levels where infectivity has not been determined. Therefore, these 
existing 4 month travel deferral policies assist with minimising the risk to fresh components 
from imported HEV infections. However, countries like Sri Lanka are progressing towards 
eliminating malaria (293), and this may necessitate reconsideration in the selection of 
blood donors in the future.  
 
Underreporting of HEV is likely as most cases are asymptomatic (13). There is also a 
likelihood of misdiagnosis, as infection with HEV shares common clinical features with 
other hepatitis viruses and drug induced liver injury (294), or the possibility of under-
diagnosis, perhaps due to limited knowledge among general practitioners concerning this 
disease. Since the majority of HEV infections with genotype 3 are asymptomatic (67-98%) 
(140), such cases are unlikely to be identified and notified. This is of particular significance 
for transfusion safety, given genotype 3 can cause chronic infection in patients with 
immunosuppressive disorders, who are disproportionately represented as fresh blood 
component recipients. Therefore, overseas acquired notification data may more likely 
represent genotype 1 and 2 infection and these data may not reflect the transfusion risk. 
Under-diagnosis is also possible as laboratory diagnosis for HEV is often considered only 
for overseas travellers in Australia (15), however, this message is actively being 
challenged by public health authorities. Moreover, the case data used in this study were 
after health care was sought, laboratory testing conducted and a confirmed diagnosis 
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made by a clinician, followed by notification to health authorities. Data analysed in this 
study therefore includes symptomatic cases of HEV in Australia only; to understand the 
real rate of HEV importation into Australia a study examining HEV prevalence in returned 
travellers is needed. In this study, no information was available on whether a notified case 
was HEV antibody and/or RNA positive, and if the latter, the infecting genotype. This 
therefore prevented hypothesising the mode of transmission. 
 
Self-limiting acute cases of HEV do not require treatment. Chronic HEV cases are treated 
with ribavirin and pegylated interferon-α (140). A vaccine, HEV 239 (Hecolin; Xiamen 
Innovax Biotech, China), has been licensed in China (15), and may be used for the high 
risk groups in countries endemic for HEV, such as women of child bearing-age. In 
developed countries like Australia, HEV safety precautions should be advised to travellers, 
and should include general awareness of pathogens transmitted via the faecal-oral route, 
as well as a recommendation for the proper handling and cooking of pork, deer and wild 
boar. Transfusion from HEV infected donors can have potentially severe consequences in 
immunocompromised recipients, and hence the threat to the blood supply from such 
donors also needs to be assessed. 
 
In Australia notified HEV infections predominantly occur in overseas travellers. This differs 
from other developed nations such as the UK where the incidence of diagnosed HEV 
infection based on notification data are considerably higher than occurs in Australia 
(approximately 6.5 times). In addition, the proportion of indigenously acquired infections in 
the UK are considerably higher than in Australia, with data from 2003-2012 indicating half 
of UK HEV infections are locally-acquired, with 71% in 2012 (280). Increase in locally- 
acquired HEV cases was observed in later years of this study, mainly during 2014, 
corresponding to an autochthonous HEV outbreak (201). Locally-acquired HEV may 
therefore contribute to disease burden in the future. 
 
To determine the threat that HEV poses specifically to the Australian blood supply the rate 
of HEV viraemia in the Australian and blood donation populations needs to be established. 
However, notification data suggests locally-acquired HEV is a rare disease and the 
majority of HEV cases were acquired from countries where donation-related travel 
restrictions for malaria exist. Given the incubation period of up to 8 weeks and expected 
length of infectious HEV viremia (4-6 weeks) in most individuals, notification data indicates 
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that existing Blood Service travel deferral policies are effective in minimising the risk from 
imported HEV infections.  
 
4.6. Contribution of the Chapter to the Research Question 
This chapter has addressed the research question of this thesis in the following ways: 
 Analysed overseas acquired HEV cases in Australia. 
 Determined highest risk countries for HEV exposure. 
 Assessed current blood donor guidelines for donors travelling to countries endemic 
for malaria. 
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Chapter 5.  Hepatitis E Virus Seroprevalence among Blood Donors in Nepal and 
Analysis of Variables as Possible Risk Factors 
 
Context 
The previous chapter (Chapter 4) identified Nepal as one of the countries at risk for HEV, 
based on the HEV notification data in Australia. This chapter aims to measure HEV 
seroprevalence in Nepal (a developing country endemic for HEV) and identify possible risk 
factors. This study assists in identifying differences in HEV exposure status between 
Nepalese and Australian blood donors. The study also looks at the impact of the 2015 
earthquakes in Nepal on the possible occurrence of hepatitis E outbreak. 
 
This chapter has been submitted to a peer-reviewed journal: 
Shrestha AC, Flower RLP, Seed CR, Hoad V, Rajkarnikar M, Shrestha SK, Thapa U, 
Faddy HM. Hepatitis E Virus Seroepidemiology: A Post-Earthquake Study among Among 
Blood Donors in Nepal.  
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5.1.  Introduction 
HEV has gained public health attention as one of the causative agents of viral hepatitis. 
The four genotypes of this non-enveloped RNA virus differ in mode of transmission and 
geographical occurrence (15, 138). In developing countries, major outbreaks of HEV with 
genotypes 1 and 2 are associated with transmission via the faecal-oral route (138, 140). In 
developed countries, HEV has traditionally been associated with travel to countries 
endemic for HEV (295), however, locally-acquired HEV infections, associated with 
zoonotic transmission, are increasingly reported in such countries (102, 103). 
 
In 2005, the global burden of HEV with genotypes 1 and 2 was estimated to be 20.1 million 
incident infections, which resulted in an estimate of 3.4 million symptomatic cases, 70,000 
deaths and 3,000 stillbirths [8]. This estimate was based on nine regions of Asia and Africa 
[8]. Of the incident infections, 72% occurred in East- and South-Asia [8]. 
 
In Nepal, regular HEV outbreaks have occurred during the previous 4 decades, with 
reported outbreaks in 1973, 1981-1982, 1987, 1995 and 2014 (128, 148, 202). During 
these outbreaks, a maternal mortality rate of 21-25% was reported (148). During an 
outbreak in Biratnagar in 2014, the case fatality rate was 0.2% (202). HEV IgG prevalence 
in 1999-2000 was estimated to be 38% among the general population of Nepal (148). 
Kathmandu was designated hyper-endemic for HEV, with rural areas non-endemic (148). 
A recent study has demonstrated HEV IgG prevalence of 47% among patients visiting a 
hospital in Kathmandu (166). HEV infections have also been reported in travellers to Nepal 
(265, 296, 297). Poor infrastructure development in terms of water supply and sewerage 
systems can facilitate the contamination of drinking water, especially during the summer 
monsoon season (13). Epidemics have been associated with faecal contamination of 
water, and molecular characterization has shown genotype 1 as a cause of acute HEV 
infection (203). HEV antibodies and RNA have been detected in farm swine from 
Kathmandu (124), indicating the possibility of zoonotic transmission in addition to the usual 
faeco-oral route.  
 
In 2001, an HEV vaccine trial was conducted in Nepalese army recruits (209). A Phase II 
trial of the vaccine was planned with the Nepalese community, but approval to commence 
the trial was not given for ethical and political reasons (208). With the availability of a 
second vaccine candidate, HEV 239 (Hecolin : Xiamen Innovax Biotech, Xiamen, China), 
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there has been considerable debate in relation to the introduction of an HEV vaccine in 
Nepal (298-300).  
 
The recent devastating earthquakes that occurred on 25th April and 12th May 2015 in 
Nepal raised concerns that the risk of an imminent HEV outbreak was very high, with HEV 
possibly causing up to 510 deaths in pregnant women (299). During these earthquakes 
and their aftermath, 8,891 people lost their lives (301), with many left homeless having to 
share common shelter under tents for months. Under such overcrowded living conditions 
poor sanitation and hygiene were likely and individuals no doubt had limited access to safe 
drinking water, contributing to increased potential for infectious disease outbreaks (299). 
The burden of HEV at this time was also expected to be high due to the approaching 
summer monsoon season and limited access to health facilities (299, 300). The study 
therefore sought to estimate the rate of previous and recent HEV infection in Nepalese 
blood donors in the months following the large earthquakes. This study aimed to provide 
surveillance data about HEV in Nepal, determine the possible impact of the recent 
earthquakes through serological evidence of recent HEV exposure, and analyse variables 
as possible risk factors for exposure to HEV.  
 
5.2. Aims 
This study aimed to: 
 Measure previous, recent and current HEV infection among blood donors in Nepal 
(an endemic country) 
 Identify variables associated with HEV exposure in Nepal 
 Determine the possible impact of the recent earthquakes through serological 
evidence of recent HEV exposure 
 
5.3. Methods 
5.3.1. Sample Population 
This was a cross-sectional study based on a convenience sampling method. A total of 
1,845 blood donors eligible to donate blood as per the criteria of the Central Blood 
Transfusion Service, Nepal Red Cross Society, were included in this study. A cross 
section of samples was collected at blood transfusion services in Kathmandu (n=1,435), 
Chitwan (n=159), Bhaktapur (n=135), and Kavre (n=116) (Figure 5.1), during the months 
June-September, 2015. The required sample size for Kathmandu was estimated, using 
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standard methods (302), to be 1,448, based on the assumption of 38% HEV IgG 
prevalence (148), 95% confidence interval, and an absolute precision of 2.5% (Appendix 
I.c). Sample numbers from the other districts were based on accessibility to the donor 
population. Consent was obtained from participating blood donors, and details including 
age, sex and other variables were collected via additional questionnaire (Appendix VII.a, 
VII.b). Ethical approval was obtained from the Nepal Health Research Council and the 
University of Queensland Human Research Ethics Committee (Appendix II.e, II.f). 
 
Figure 5.1: Selected districts for collection of blood donor samples, Nepal. 
 
5.3.2. Sample Collection 
Blood donor samples were collected in BD Vacutainer® PPT™ Plasma Preparation Tubes 
(Becton, Dickson and Company (BD) Biosciences, San Diego, USA). Samples were 
centrifuged at 1,258 g for 5 minutes before storage at -200C until testing.  
 
5.3.3. Variables Obtained through Additional Questionnaire 
In order to identify possible risk factors associated with HEV exposure, the following 
variables were included in the additional questionnaire: 
1. Donor status: Donors who had previously donated were categorised as repeat donors 
and those who were donating for the first time as new donors.  
2. History of jaundice: Jaundice was defined as any known feature of jaundice including 
yellow discolouration of skin and hepatitis, whether or not a donor required medical 
support. Family member jaundice referred to when any family member of a donor had 
jaundice, as defined above. 
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3. Source of drinking water: Donors were asked about their drinking water source, whether 
it be from a community tap (common tap in the community), municipality (water supplied 
at home by the local government authority), or underground (ground water source 
including hand-pumps and wells). Donors responding to two or more options were 
categorised as relying on multiple sources. Those reporting sources other than those 
mentioned above including bottled water were categorised as ‘other’. 
4. Drinking water treatment method: Donors were asked how they treated water for 
drinking purposes, which included: boiling (boiling water prior to drinking); filtering 
(filtration of water); chemical treatment (use of water purifier chemicals); or, no 
treatment (drinking directly from source). Donors with multiple options selected were 
categorised as multiple methods. 
5. Vegetarianism: Donors who ate meat were categorised as non-vegetarian, while others 
were categorised as vegetarian.  
6. Pork consumption: Non-vegetarians who ate pork were categorised as pork consumers 
and others as pork non-consumers. 
7. International travel: Donors who had travelled to other countries were categorised as 
international travellers, while those who had not, as non-travellers. 
 
5.3.4. Sample Testing 
All samples were de-linked prior to testing. Plasma samples were tested individually for 
HEV IgM (Wantai HEV-IgM ELISA, Beijing Wantai Biological Pharmacy Enterprise Co., 
Ltd, Beijing, China), as per the manufacturer’s instructions (Appendix III.b). Any samples 
testing positive were re-tested in duplicate. Samples that were reactive two or three times 
were reported as HEV IgM positive (Figure 5.2). All samples were also tested for HEV-IgG 
(Wantai HEV IgG ELISA, Beijing Wantai Biological Pharmacy Enterprise Co., Ltd) and 
HEV antigen (Wantai HEV-Ag Plus ELISA, Beijing Wantai Biological Pharmacy Enterprise 
Co., Ltd) as per the manufacturer’s instructions (Appendix III.a, III.c) using the same 
testing algorithm as mentioned above for HEV IgM (Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2: Algorithm for sample testing 
 
5.3.5. Statistical Analysis 
Donor data obtained from the questionnaire were entered in to a Microsoft Excel 2010 
(Redmond, WA, USA) database. Proportions of donors HEV IgG, IgM or antigen positive 
were calculated overall and for each of the study variables, and 95% CIs estimated. IBM 
SPSS Statistics 23 (IBM Centre, NSW, Australia) was used to analyse for statistical 
inference (chi-square, odds ratio) and to determine association with variables. HEV IgG, 
IgM and antigen seropositivity were analysed as dependent variables and study variables 
as independent variables. Only those variables which were individually significant were 
included together in multivariate analyses. Some donors did not answer some of the 
questions on the questionnaire, resulting in missing data for some variables. In these 
instances, the missing data were subjected to multiple imputations prior to regression 
analyses. Thus, in the absence of data from donors not responding to the study variables, 
potential bias in the inference could not be excluded. In addition, donors’ responses to the 
questions were based on recollection, introducing the risk of possible recall bias. 
 
5.4. Results 
Of the 1,845 samples tested, 55 (2.98%, 95% CI 2.21-3.76%) were positive for HEV IgM. 
The proportion of donors with both HEV IgM and IgG was 2.7%. HEV IgM prevalence was 
associated with a donor reporting having a history of jaundice or reporting pork 
consumption (p<0.05) (multivariate analysis) (Table 5.1 and 5.2). No associations were 
observed for the other factors investigated. Of the donors residing in earthquake affected 
regions (Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Kavre), 3.20% (95% CI 2.36-4.04%) of donors were 
Sample 
HEV IgG HEV IgM HEV Ag 
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Positive  
(2/3, 3/3) 
Negative 
(1/3) 
Positive 
(2/3, 3/3) 
Negative 
(1/3) 
Positive 
(2/3,3/3) 
Negative 
(1/3) 
Singlet 
Duplicate 
Singlet Singlet 
Duplicate Duplicate 
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HEV IgM positive, and two donors were positive for HEV antigen. These HEV antigen 
positive individuals were also HEV IgG positive, but negative for HEV IgM (Table 5.3). 
Both HEV antigen positive donors were from Kathmandu and 36 years of age. 
 
Table 5.1: Univariate analysis of study variables and HEV IgM seropositivity 
Variable n tested HEV IgM seropositive Chi square 
N % (95% CI) Odds ratio (95% 
CI) 
p 
value
Sex      
Female 306 4 1.31 (0.03-2.58) †  
Male 1,539 51 3.31 (2.42-4.21) 2.59 (0.93-7.21) >0.05
Age >0.05
< 25 years 735 18 2.45 (1.33-3.57)  †  
25-34 years 682 22 3.23 (1.90-4.55) 1.33 (0.71-2.50) >0.05
35-44 years 315 10 3.17 (1.24-5.11) 1.31 (0.60-2.86) >0.05
45-54 years 99 5 5.05 (0.74-9.36) 2.12 (0.77-5.84) >0.05
55-64 years 14 0 0 0 >0.05
District >0.05
Bhaktapur 135 6 4.44 (0.97-7.92) 7.35 (0.87-61.82) >0.05
Kavre 116 3 2.59 (0-5.47) 4.20 (0.43-40.85) >0.05
Kathmandu 1,435 45 3.14 (2.23-4.04) 5.12 (0.70-37.36) >0.05
Chitwan 159 1 0.63 (0-1.86) †  
Donor status 
Repeat 1,265 40 3.16 (2.20-4.13) 1.21(0.66-2.22) >0.05
First time 580 15 2.59 (1.29-3.88) †  
History of jaundice 
Yes 212 13 6.13 (2.90-9.36) 2.57 (1.35-4.88) <0.05
No 1,633 42 2.57 (1.80-3.34) †  
Family history of jaundice 
Yes 226 8 3.54 (1.13-5.95) 1.26 (0.58-2.72) >0.05
No 1,619 47 2.90 (2.09-3.72) †   
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Variable n tested HEV IgM seropositive Chi square 
N % (95% CI) Odds ratio (95% 
CI) 
p 
value
Sex      
Drinking water source >0.05 
Community tap 274 10 3.65 (1.43-5.87) 1.01 (0.33-3.04) >0.05
Municipality 940 20 2.13 (1.21-3.05) 0.57 (0.24-1.37) >0.05
Others 296 14 4.52 (2.20-6.83) 1.05 (0.21-5.29) >0.05
Multiple sources 60 2 3.23 (0-7.62) 1.23 (0.49-3.09) >0.05
Underground 250 9 3.47 (1.24-5.71) †  
Drinking water treatment >0.05 
Boiling 315 13 4.13 (1.93-6.32) †   
Filtering 1,030 30 2.91(1.89-3.94) 0.72 (0.36-1.46) >0.05
Chemical treatment 50 1 2.00 (0-5.88) 0.50 (0.06-3.91) >0.05
Multiple methods 202 4 1.98 (0.06-3.90) 0.53 (0.16-1.71) >0.05
No treatment 248 7 2.82 (0.76-4.88) 0.70 (0.27-1.81) >0.05
Vegetarianism  
Yes 1,663 48 2.89 (2.08-3.69) †  
No 182 7 3.85 (1.05-6.64) 1.43 (0.64-3.22) >0.05
Pork consumption  
Yes 700 29 4.14 (2.67-5.62) 1.89 (1.08-3.28) <0.05
No 1,145 26 2.27 (1.41-3.13) †  
International travel  
Yes 565 15 2.65 (1.33-3.98) †   
No 1,280 40 3.13 (2.17-4.08) 1.16 (0.63-2.13) >0.05
 †: Reference group 
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Table 5.2: Multivariate analysis of study variables and HEV IgM seropositivity 
Risk factor 
Multivariate Analysis 
Adjusted Odds ratio  
(95% CI) p value 
History of jaundice (Yes/No) 2.57 (1.35-4.88) <0.05 
Pork consumption (Yes/No) 1.89 (1.08-3.28) <0.05 
 
Table 5.3: HEV antigen positive donors 
Variable Sample 1059 Sample 1303 
Collection Date 12/06/2015 13/06/2015 
Collection District Kathmandu Kathmandu 
Age 36 36 
Sex Male Female 
History of Jaundice Yes No 
Family history of jaundice No No 
Drinking water source Municipality Municipality 
Vegetarianism No No 
Pork consumption No No response 
International travel No No 
HEV IgG Positive Positive 
HEV IgM Negative Negative 
HEV antigen Positive Positive 
 
HEV IgG was detected in 773 of the 1,845 samples tested (41.90%, 95% CI 39.65-
44.15%). The prevalence was significantly higher (p<0.05) in Bhaktapur, Kavre and 
Kathmandu than the Chitwan district (Table 5.4). HEV IgG prevalence increased with 
increasing age and was highest (85.7%) in individuals above 55 years (p<0.05). HEV IgG 
prevalence was also higher in repeat blood donors, those with a history of jaundice and 
those reporting pork consumption (p<0.05) (multivariate analysis) (Table 5.5). Individuals 
who relied on drinking underground water were associated with having a lower HEV IgG 
prevalence (p<0.05) (multivariate analysis) (Table 5.5). 
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Table 5.4: Univariate analysis of study variables and HEV IgG seropositivity 
Variable n 
tested 
HEV IgG seropositive Chi square 
n % (95% CI) Odds ratio  
(95% CI) 
p 
value 
Sex 
Female 306 109 35.62 (30.26-40.99) †  
Male 1,539 664 43.14 (40.67-45.62) 1.37(1.06-1.77) <0.05 
Age <0.05 
< 25 years 735 155 21.09 (18.14-24.04) †   
25-34 years 682 330 48.39 (44.64-52.14) 3.51 (2.78-4.43) <0.05 
35-44 years 315 203 64.44 (59.16-69.73) 6.78 (5.07-9.07) <0.05 
45-54 years 99 73 73.74 (65.07-82.41) 10.51 (6.49-17.00) <0.05 
55-64 years 14 12 85.71 (67.38-44.15) 22.45 (4.97-101.37) <0.05 
Districts 0.00 
Bhaktapur 135 74 54.81(46.42-63.21) 10.84 (5.85-20.11) <0.05 
Kavre 116 52 44.83 (35.78-53.88) 7.26 (3.86-13.68) <0.05 
Kathmandu 1,435 631 43.97 (41.4-46.54) 7.01 (4.14-11.88) <0.05 
Chitwan 159 16 10.06 (5.39-14.74) †  
Donor status 
Repeat 1,264 606 47.94 (45.19-50.70) 2.28 (1.84-2.82) <0.05 
First time 581 167 28.74 (25.06-32.42) †  
History of jaundice 
Yes 213 119 55.87 (49.20-62.54) 1.91(1.43-2.55) <0.05 
No 1,632 654 40.07 (37.70-42.45) †  
Family history of jaundice 
Yes 227 114 50.22 (43.72-56.72) 1.47 (1.10-1.97) <0.05 
No 1,618 659 40.73 (38.34-43.12) †  
Drinking water source 
Community tap 273 103 37.72 (31.98-43.48) 1.19 (0.83-1.70) >0.05 
Municipality 940 423 45.00 (41.82-48.18) 1.62 (1.21-2.17) <0.05 
Others 309 135 43.69 (38.16-49.22) 1.31 (0.73-2.33) >0.05 
Multiple sources 63 25 39.68 (27.60-51.76) 1.54 (1.09-2.17) <0.05 
Underground 260 87 33.46 (27.73-39.20) †  
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Variable n 
tested 
HEV IgG seropositive Chi square 
n % (95% CI) Odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
p 
value 
Drinking water treatment 
Boiling 315 117 37.14 (31.81-42.48) †  
Filtering 1,030 448 43.50 (40.47-46.52) 1.31 (1.01-1.70) <0.05 
Chemical 
treatment 
49 18 36.73 (23.24-50.23) 1.00 (0.54-1.88) >0.05 
Multiple methods 203 91 44.83 (37.99-51.67) 1.39 (0.97-1.99) >0.05 
No treatment 248 99 39.92 (33.82-46.01) 1.13 (0.80-1.59) >0.05 
Vegetarianism 
Yes 1,662 701 42.18 (39.80-44.55) 1.13 (0.83-1.55) >0.05 
No 183 72 39.34 (32.27-46.42) †   
Pork consumption 
Yes 701 323 46.08 (42.39-49.77) 1.32 (1.09-1.60) <0.05 
No 1,144 450 39.34 (36.50-42.17) †   
International travel 
Yes 565 280 49.56 (45.43-53.68) 1.56 (1.28-1.92) <0.05 
No 1,280 493 38.52 (35.85-41.18) †   
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Table 5.5: Multivariate analysis of study variables and HEV IgG seropositivity 
Risk factor 
Multivariate Analysis 
Adjusted Odds ratio (95% 
CI) p value 
Sex (Male/Female) 1.29 (0.96-1.73) >0.05 
Age  <0.05 
< 25 years †  
25-34 years 3.48 (2.71-4.48) <0.05 
35-44 years 7.60 (5.50-10.50) <0.05 
45-54 years 10.88 (6.47-18.30) <0.05 
55-64 years 24.57 (4.86-124.28) <0.05 
District  <0.05 
Bhaktapur 13.49 (6.98-26.09) <0.05 
Kavre 7.01 (3.57-13.79) <0.05 
Kathmandu 8.02 (4.59-14.01) <0.05 
Chitwan †  
Donor status (Repeat/First) 1.36 (1.07-1.74) <0.05 
History of Jaundice (Yes/No) 1.95 (1.39-2.72) <0.05 
Family history of jaundice (Yes/No) 1.23 (0.87-1.75) >0.05 
Drinking Water Source  <0.05 
Community tap 1.40 (1.02-1.92) <0.05 
Municipality 0.94 (0.50-1.76) >0.05 
Others 1.18 (0.81-1.73) >0.05 
Multiple sources 0.83 (0.56-1.24) >0.05 
Underground †   
Pork consumption (Yes/No) 1.30 (1.04-1.63) <0.05 
International travel (Yes/No) 0.92 (0.73-1.17) >0.05 
†: Reference group 
 
5.5. Discussion 
HEV outbreaks occur sporadically in developing countries due to faecal contamination of 
water and poor sanitation (108). Given a relatively high mortality rate (0.2-4%), which is 
particularly high in pregnant women (10-25%) (13) and there is potential for rapid 
increases in case numbers with limited duration of protective immunity, HEV is a topic of 
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public health concern in developing countries. Recent devastating earthquakes in Nepal 
could have facilitated an outbreak of HEV. In this study, we measured previous and 
current HEV infection in Nepalese blood donors after recent major earthquakes to provide 
surveillance data on HEV in Nepal and to determine possible risk factors for HEV 
exposure.  
 
In this study, higher HEV IgG and IgM prevalence was observed in donors who reported 
eating pork, which is likely an indicator of zoonotic transmission (303). HEV RNA and 
antibodies have been detected in domestic swine in Kathmandu (124). This suggests 
zoonotic transmission via consumption of undercooked pork may also contribute to the 
burden of HEV in Nepal. However, to date, isolation of HEV genotype 3 from humans 
associated with swine has not been reported in Nepal. 
 
HEV IgG prevalence in the blood donor population studied was relatively high. This is in a 
similar range to previous estimates in Nepal based on population studies (148, 166). HEV 
IgG prevalence was highest in Bhaktapur and lowest was in Chitwan, indicating HEV 
exposure varies between the different regions of Nepal. Geography and other factors, 
such as water supply systems, in these districts are likely to contribute to these observed 
differences. HEV IgG prevalence increased with age, which is in agreement with studies in 
other countries (162, 266), and indicates cumulative exposure. However, this observation 
differs from previous studies in Nepal, which have shown non-uniform increase with age 
(148, 166). The variation is likely to be due to differences in cohort selection between the 
studies.  
 
Lower HEV IgG prevalence was associated with individuals relying on an underground 
water source. This could be due to less likelihood of faecal contamination of underground 
water compared to other sources. With the drinking water pipelines being adjacent to the 
sewer system in the Kathmandu district, there is a chance that the drinking water could be 
contaminated in the event of sewer leakage (148).  
 
HEV antigen, indicative of current HEV infection, was detected in 2 donors from 
Kathmandu. Both of these donors were positive for HEV IgG, but negative for HEV IgM. 
This indicates HEV antigen is likely to persist for a short period and is undetectable by the 
time of appearance of HEV IgM. Concurrent detection of HEV antigen and IgG in both 
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these donors could indicate re-infection with HEV. In the absence of HEV RNA testing, the 
infectious state of these donors could not be determined.  
 
This study was conducted during the months June-September, 2015, after the devastating 
earthquakes and the monsoon season period, when waterborne outbreaks of HEV were 
likely to occur (299, 304). Bhaktapur, Kavre and Kathmandu were among the earthquake-
affected districts. In these regions, we report that 3.2% (54/1,686) of the healthy population 
demonstrated recent HEV exposure (through detection of HEV IgM) and we detected two 
donors with HEV antigen. This rate of HEV IgM prevalence was higher than in the non-
earthquake affected region, Chitwan; however, a similar pattern was observed for HEV 
IgG, suggesting less HEV transmission in the Chitwan district. During an epidemic in 
Biratnagar, Nepal, 2014, HEV IgM prevalence was as high as 94-100% in acute hepatitis 
patients (202). In our study, subjects were blood donors, considered healthy and therefore 
would not capture the symptomatic group of the population. HEV IgM and antigen 
detection are likely to represent asymptomatic infections in blood donors. Since 
symptomatic HEV cases are unlikely to be included, studying blood donors may result in 
an inability to detect the full magnitude of an outbreak. Selecting well donors may 
additionally result in selection bias of those with pre-existing immunity in hyperendemic 
areas.  
 
In the absence of complete population data during epidemic and inter-epidemic periods of 
HEV circulation, there is no definitive IgM positivity proportion that can be used to define a 
recent outbreak. The majority of serological studies in epidemics are done in acute cases, 
and not relevant to background population seroprevalence. However, population 
serosurveys during known large outbreaks indicate a higher prevalence of IgM positivity 
than detected in this study. In Sudan in 2012 a serosurvey performed before a large 
outbreak peak in refugee camps demonstrated an IgM positivity rate of 21.7% (305). 
Similarly, in a serosurvey of children aged 0-15 during an Ugandan outbreak, IgM positivity 
was 37.3% (306). In endemic areas, asymptomatic positivity in blood donors varies from 
0.5% to 5% (242, 244, 307-309). In this study, finding of 3.2% IgM positivity in blood 
donors from earthquake-affected regions is consistent with ongoing endemic transmission. 
Therefore, this study did not find strong evidence of a large post-earthquake HEV 
outbreak. 
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HEV outbreaks in Nepal are either focal (where a large number of cases occur over days 
to weeks in a well-defined small population) or epidemic (148). This study did not have the 
power to detect a focal outbreak. The failure of this study to provide evidence of a large 
HEV outbreak in the months directly following the earthquakes reflects either inability of 
the study to detect the outbreak, or the absence of an HEV outbreak. It has been 
estimated that 390,000 individuals left the Kathmandu region immediately following the 
earthquakes, with movements into the area significantly below normal (310). These 
population flows may have decreased the HEV population susceptibility. If migrant 
populations with lower HEV immunity were disproportionately removed from the at risk 
population this would decrease the likelihood of an outbreak. The impact of earthquake 
relief support to public health threats such as provision of clean water and increased 
awareness of the risk may have also decreased the likelihood of an outbreak. 
Alternatively, given the lack of baseline HEV IgM positivity in Nepalese blood donors, it 
may be that 3.2% exposure represents a small outbreak. This argument is strengthened 
by the prolonged epidemic pattern that typically occurs in Kathmandu and the transient 
nature of IgM positivity (12). However, there are no recent published reports on HEV 
clinical cases that would indicate an outbreak in the general population post-earthquake.  
  
Since HEV in developing countries is commonly associated with drinking contaminated 
water, there is less awareness of the potential risk of this virus to blood transfusion safety. 
A retrospective study in India has shown a higher prevalence of HEV infection markers 
among blood transfusion recipients compared to control groups (157). HEV is a possible 
risk to blood supply safety in developed countries (14, 162, 311). For developing countries, 
however, the main concerns are other modes of transmission, which are the major 
contributors to the burden of disease. However, HEV can cause chronic infection in 
immunocompromised individuals (13, 259), and contributes to a higher mortality rate in 
women during third trimester of pregnancy (140). Hence, a safe blood supply for these 
high-risk vulnerable patients should also be of concern in developing countries.  
 
In summary, HEV infection in Nepalese blood donors is comparable to the general 
population. Past exposure to HEV was associated with multiple factors, including age, 
district of blood collection and consumption of pork. In developing countries like Nepal, 
where the main transmission route is faecal oral, other modes of transmission including 
zoonotic and transfusion may also occur. Detection of recent HEV infection in the donor 
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population demonstrates the risk of transfusion-transmission in vulnerable patients in 
Nepal. Unexpectedly, this study did not provide evidence of a sizeable HEV outbreak after 
the devastating earthquakes in 2015.  
 
5.6. Contribution of the Chapter to the Research Question 
This chapter has addressed the research question of this thesis in the following ways: 
 Measured HEV exposure status in blood donors in an HEV endemic country. 
 Assessed variables associated with HEV exposure in Nepalese blood donors. 
 Provided data to discuss the differences in HEV prevalence between an endemic 
and a non-endemic country. 
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Chapter 6. General Discussion, Conclusion, Risk Management Options, Future 
Research Directions and Summary 
 
 
Context 
This chapter discusses the major findings from the individual research chapters and how 
they address the overall research hypothesis. Management options to reduce TT-HEV risk 
are outlined and future research directions discussed. 
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6.1. General Discussion 
TTIs are one of the risks for transfusion safety. Well-characterised TTIs are managed by 
stringent donor selection and sensitive screening tests. However, there is a threat to blood 
safety from emerging infectious diseases for which prevention strategies may not be in 
place. HEV is an emerging pathogen of possible threat to blood supply safety and has 
therefore gained significance in the international transfusion community. There are 
numerous reports describing the detection of HEV RNA in asymptomatic blood donors 
from developed countries (190, 255), which may lead to chronic infection in 
immunocompromised transfusion recipients (190). Given this, countries including the UK, 
Ireland and France have proposed the introduction of blood donation screening for HEV 
(262-264). It was therefore necessary to undertake an evaluation of the risk posed by HEV 
to blood supply safety in Australia. This is the first study to provide a quantitative 
assessment of HEV in Australia, to determine the risk posed by this virus to blood supply 
safety. 
 
6.1.1. Seroprevalence of HEV in Australian Blood Donors 
This study (chapter 2) measured HEV IgG prevalence of 5.99% in Australian donors, and 
demonstrated HEV exposure in international travellers and non-travellers, suggesting the 
possibility of both imported and locally-acquired HEV in Australia. The study also 
demonstrated prior HEV exposure was higher in donors who would have been temporarily 
excluded from donating on previous donation attempts for malaria and/or diarrhoea, 
suggesting the current management strategy in Australia is partially effective in minimizing 
any risk of TT-HEV. Occurrence of HEV IgG in donors who reported no overseas travel 
and/or no prior related deferrals coupled with the knowledge that asymptomatic infection is 
possible, suggests that additional safety precautions such as HEV RNA donation 
screening may be warranted.  
 
6.1.2. Detection of Current Markers of HEV Infection in Australian Blood Donations 
This study (chapter 3) provided evidence of current markers of HEV infection in Australian 
blood donations. This was the first study to measure prevalence of HEV antigen and HEV 
RNA in a large number of Australian blood donations. This study identified one HEV RNA 
positive donation, suggesting the rate of collecting an HEV infectious donations was 1 in 
14,799 donations (95% CI: 1 in 2,657 to 1 in 584,530). In Australia, the risk of collecting an 
HEV infectious donation was lower than in most of other developed countries. The 
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infecting genotype was determined to be HEV genotype 3, suggesting the donor could 
have acquired HEV infection through zoonotic transmission, either in Australia or while 
travelling overseas to developed countries. The viral load in the HEV RNA positive sample 
was estimated to be 15,000 IU/ml, which was within the range associated with TT-HEV in 
the UK (400 and 250,000 IU/mL) (190). Unfortunately, as this study was de-linked, risk of 
transfusion transmissibility from this donation was unable to be determined. This study 
was also the first to measure HEV antigen in Australian blood donations. HEV antigen was 
detected in 0.35% of blood donations. HEV RNA was detected in only one of the above 
antigen positive samples, showing poor agreement between the screening tests and 
suggesting these markers may occur at different stages of infection. However, considering 
RNA detection as a ‘gold standard’ for HEV (240), the risk for this study was calculated 
based on the detection of HEV RNA in blood donations. 
 
6.1.3. Overseas-Acquired Hepatitis E Virus in Australia and Blood Supply Safety 
This study (chapter 4) demonstrated that the majority of HEV cases notified in Australia 
are acquired overseas (83%), especially in South Asian countries. This was in agreement 
with higher HEV IgG prevalence observed among blood donors who reported overseas 
travel compared to those who had not travelled (Chapter 2 as discussed above in section 
6.1.1). However, notified cases represent symptomatic infections and seroprevalence in 
donors is likely to represent both asymptomatic and symptomatic cases (previously 
infected and recovered). The majority of HEV importations were acquired from countries 
where donation-related travel restrictions for malaria exist. This study showed that 94% of 
notified overseas-acquired HEV cases were acquired from countries where donors are 
currently restricted from donating fresh components for 4 months after leaving such 
countries. However, individuals remain eligible to donate plasma for fractionation during 
the restrictive period. In Australia, though overseas acquired HEV cases make up the 
majority of notifications, locally-acquired cases, associated with zoonotic transmission are 
also reported (201). HEV risk to blood safety should, therefore also be considered in 
international non-travellers. Currently, this is managed by donor screening through 
questionnaire, which is likely to prevent symptomatic donors from donating. Given that the 
majority of HEV cases are asymptomatic in developed countries (140), infected donors 
with no symptoms may escape screening prior to donation. 
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6.1.4. HEV Seroprevalence among Blood Donors in Nepal 
This study (chapter 5) provided HEV surveillance data in Nepalese blood donors. HEV IgG 
prevalence in Nepalese donors (41.90%) was almost seven times higher than in Australian 
donors. Higher HEV prevalence in Nepalese blood donors was in agreement with the 
findings from chapter 4 (discussed in section 6.1.3), which showed a large number of 
imported HEV cases from Nepal in Australia. This study also demonstrated that the rate of 
HEV exposure in Nepal varied between the different regions studied. This observation was 
different to that in Australia with no significant difference observed between the states. 
HEV IgM was detected in 2.98% of Nepalese donors, indicating recent HEV infection. This 
study was conducted after the devastating earthquakes in 2015, when waterborne 
outbreaks of HEV were predicted to occur. In the studied earthquake affected areas, HEV 
IgM was measured to be 3.2%, which was within the range reported in blood donors from 
HEV endemic countries (0.5%-5%) (96, 119, 242, 307). This finding was consistent with 
ongoing endemic transmission and therefore did not provide strong evidence of a large 
post-earthquake HEV outbreak. Multivariate analyses revealed a number of variables 
associated with previous exposure to HEV in Nepalese blood donors, such as age, district 
of blood collection, history of jaundice, frequency of blood donation, source of drinking 
water and consumption of pork. In developing countries like Nepal, although the faecal oral 
route is a major transmission route, other modes of transmission are possible including 
zoonotic and transfusion. Given a fatality rate of 4% and maternal mortality rate of 25% in 
developing countries (13), risk of transfusion-transmission should also be considered for 
high risk groups including pregnant women and immunocompromised individuals in the 
absence of an approved vaccine. 
 
6.2. Conclusion 
This thesis provided a comprehensive evaluation of the risk posed by HEV to blood supply 
safety (summarised in figure 6.1). This work addressed knowledge gaps in relation to the 
burden of HEV in Australia and analysed HEV risk to transfusion safety.  
 
This study showed that 5.99% of Australian blood donors have been previously exposed to 
HEV. HEV RNA prevalence was 0.006%, giving a risk of collecting a viremic donation of 1 
in 14,799 (95% CI 1 in 2,657 to 1 in 584,530). Given the wide confidence interval, there is 
considerable uncertainty in this estimate, which may complicate future risk management 
modelling. The one HEV RNA positive sample was genotype 3, which indicates zoonotic 
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transmission, possibly acquired locally. Given that up to 98% of infections with genotype 3 
and 4 are asymptomatic (140), and these genotypes occur in developed countries, locally-
acquired HEV infection in Australian donors may pose a risk to blood supply safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Summary of research aims, results and conclusions 
This study provides evidence that the current Blood Service guidelines for donors 
travelling to malaria endemic countries mitigate the majority of the TT-HEV risk for fresh 
component donations. However, there remains a risk with plasma destined for 
fractionation. The fractionation process includes viral inactivation steps such as 
immunoaffinity chromatography, nanofiltration, cold ethanol fractionation and heat 
• HEV risk to blood supply in Australia is low compared to many developed countries 
• HEV risk to blood supply safety in Australia differs to risk in a developing country 
• Current Blood Service guidelines partially mitigate the risk of TT-HEV for fresh 
components → locally acquired asymptomatic HEV infection may still pose a risk to 
blood supply safety 
1. Determine if 
Australian blood 
donors were 
exposed to HEV 
3. Assess whether 
current Australian 
donor guidelines 
manage any TT-HEV 
4. Compare HEV 
prevalence in Australia 
with an HEV endemic 
country (Nepal)
Research Hypothesis: 
HEV pose a risk to the 
safety of the Australian 
blood supply 
Chapter 5 
• 41.89% of 
Nepalese blood 
donors were 
previously 
exposed to HEV 
 
• Recent HEV 
infection was 
demonstrated in 
2.98% of blood 
donors 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 
• Risk to blood 
supply safety 
from both 
imported and 
autochthonous 
HEV identified 
• 94% of imported 
HEV cases 
managed by 
existing travel 
Chapter 2 and 3 
 
• 5.99% of 
Australian 
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• HEV RNA was 
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0.006% of blood 
donations 
 
2. Estimate 
the risk of TT-
HEV 
Chapter 3 
 
• Risk of 
collecting 
an HEV 
infectious 
donation 
was 1 in 
14,799 
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treatment, which have been shown to reduce the infectivity of HEV by 3-4 log (48). Given 
these moderate reductions in HEV infectivity, the consequences of the residual viral 
infectivity in fractionated plasma products remain to be determined. Countries not covered 
by the malaria related travel restrictions contribute to only a small number of HEV imported 
cases in Australia, and are unlikely to pose a significant risk to transfusion safety with 
respect to fresh components.  
 
This study also provided evidence of higher HEV exposure in Nepalese blood donors 
compared to Australian donors. Nepal is a developing country, endemic for HEV. Priorities 
for the prevention of TT-HEV in such countries differ based on the overall burden of 
disease, modes of HEV transmission and risk reduction achieved for other conventional 
TTIs. Although, HEV in Nepal is mainly associated with the faecal-oral route, the risk of 
TT-HEV to vulnerable groups should also be considered. Nepal is also endemic for 
malaria, therefore, Australian donors travelling to Nepal would be deferred from donating 
fresh components for 4 months after their return to Australia. This suggests the risk of TT-
HEV to the Australian blood supply from donors travelling to Nepal is adequately 
managed.  
 
HEV risk to blood supply safety in Australia appears lower than in most developed 
countries. However, the rate of autochthonous HEV infection needs to be monitored and 
the risk of TT-HEV from locally-acquired cases remains to be assessed. Given 
asymptomatic infections are possible, in the absence of mandatory testing for this virus, 
locally-acquired HEV infections in blood donors could escape current screening methods. 
This study highlights the need for continual due diligence and hemovigilance in relation to 
transfusion-transmitted emerging infectious diseases. 
 
6.3. Management Options to Reduce the Risk of TT-HEV 
Risk of TT-HEV varies in different countries based on local epidemiology, including mode 
of transmission, risk behaviours of donors and existing strategies for transfusion-
transmitted infectious disease management. In general, risk of TT-HEV can be managed 
or reduced by implementing the following, individually or in combination, based on the 
local situation: 
 Increasing the awareness of environmental sources of HEV exposure among the 
general population for the prevention of infection and transmission. 
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 Increasing the awareness of HEV among clinicians particularly in relation to the 
occurrence of locally-acquired HEV. 
 Recommending HEV testing in acute hepatitis patients with no international travel. 
 Increasing the awareness of HEV among blood donors in relation to risk behaviours 
such as unsafe drinking water, consumption of undercooked pork and travel to HEV 
endemic countries. 
 Developing additional questions on the donor questionnaire considering risk factors 
associated with HEV infection, such as including a question on preference for 
eating undercooked pork. 
 Introducing pathogen inactivation (if level of inactivation is considered to be 
appropriate and if the technology is approved for use) to inactivate HEV in fresh 
components. 
 Introducing an HEV screening assay either for universal testing, or for specific 
donations such as from donors with identified risk behaviours and/or for vulnerable 
groups of transfusion recipients (immunocompromised, pregnant women).  
 
6.4.  Future Research Directions 
This thesis has evaluated the risk posed by HEV to blood supply safety based on testing 
donor samples and quantitative analysis of notified HEV cases in Australia. This study has 
opened doors for future research, for the management of HEV in Australia, which could 
include: 
 A linked study designed to identify HEV infected donors. This would provide further 
information to understand risk factors for HEV exposure and prevent the possibility 
of TT-HEV.  
 A cost-effectiveness analysis for the introduction of laboratory testing of blood 
donations for HEV. Such a study is necessary to determine the feasibility for the 
implementation of HEV testing of donation samples. 
 A study on HEV in acute hepatitis patients with no international travel history. This 
would assist in understanding the extent of locally-acquired HEV. 
 Studies on HEV in animals and food products derived from animals that could 
contribute to the occurrence of zoonotic transmission. This would identify possible 
sources of infection that may contribute to locally-acquired HEV in Australia. 
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 Studies, using animal models, to determine the infectious dose of HEV for 
transmission through blood transfusion. This would assist in determining the 
infective dose required for TT-HEV.  
 
6.5. Summary 
Knowledge of HEV pathogenesis, epidemiology and diagnosis has increased with the 
continual research over the past 30 years. Indeed, HEV is endemic in developing countries 
and genotype 1 and 2 are associated with water borne outbreaks (125). Zoonotic 
transmission with genotypes 3 and 4 is also plausible in such countries. In developed 
countries, hepatitis E was considered rare and reported in travellers returning from 
countries endemic for HEV. However, autochthonous HEV linked to zoonotic transmission 
is reported in developed countries (103, 163, 246), including Australia (201). This could be 
attributed to changes in risk behaviours among humans, such as increased consumption 
of undercooked pork.  
 
HEV was considered to cause only self-limiting acute hepatitis, but there are a number of 
case reports of chronic infection in immunocompromised individuals (143, 258, 312). 
Surprisingly, the virus has been reported to cause extrahepatic illness, including 
neurological complications (such as Guillain-Barré syndrome, neuritis), glomerulonephritis 
and pancreatitis (13, 313). 
 
HEV is also a pathogen of interest to the transfusion science community. Given that HEV 
causes asymptomatic infection, HEV RNA has been detected in healthy blood donors and 
cases of TT-HEV have been reported (190). Since, HEV can lead to chronic infection 
(258), transfusion transmission to immunocompromised individuals is a major concern in 
developed nations. Although the disease caused by HEV is not severe compared to other 
well-known viral TTIs (HIV, HBV and HCV), the residual risk of TT-HEV is higher in most 
developed countries (311). Safety precautions such as laboratory testing of blood 
donations for HEV seem to be necessary for at least vulnerable groups.  
 
The occurrence of water-borne HEV outbreaks in developing countries together with 
locally-acquired zoonotic and TT-HEV cases in developed nations have led to increased 
awareness of hepatitis E as a pathogen of global significance. The development of 
sensitive laboratory testing for HEV has also contributed to identifying cases, and hence 
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reporting increased incidence and prevalence of HEV in recent years. Hence, HEV is an 
emerging pathogen of public health significance, which is likely to be a threat in the future 
in many countries, including Australia. 
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Appendix I: Sample Size Calculations 
 
I. a. Sample Size Calculation for HEV Seroprevalence Study in Australian Blood 
Donors (Chapter 2) 
Estimating a population proportion with specified relative precision (302) 
Seroprevalence in reference region (p) =0.04 (Prevalence = 4% (New Zealand)) 
Precision/Standard error (SE) = 0.007 (0.7%)  
Confidence Level =95% 
Sample size (n) = 1.96^2 x p(1-p)/SE^2  
= 1.96 ^2 x 0.04 (0.96)/0.007^2  
n= 3, 011 (Sample number considered for study = 3,237) 
 
I. b. Sample Size Calculation for HEV RNA Prevalence in Australian Blood Donations 
(Chapter 3) 
Sample size calculation for rate of recent HEV infection (Given the very low expected 
prevalence, the method used is based on standard error without confidence level) (302) 
Sample size, n = p(1-p)/SE^2  
p = 0.00012 (RNA prevalence in Japan is 0.012%) 
Absolute precision (SE) = 0.00009 (0.009%) 
n = 14,813 (Sample size considered for the study = 14,799) 
 
I. c. Sample Size Calculation for HEV Seroprevalence in Nepalese Blood Donors 
(Chapter 5) 
Estimating a population proportion with specified relative precision (302)  
Seroprevalence in reference region (p) =0.38 (Prevalence = 38% (Kathmandu) 
Confidence Level = 95%, 
Standard error (SE) = 0.025 (2.5%)  
Sample size (n) = 1.96^2 x p(1-p)/SE^2  
= 1.96 ^2 x 0.38 x 0.62/ 0.025^2 = 1,448 (Sample size considered for Kathmandu = 1,445) 
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Appendix II: Ethical Approvals 
 
II. a. Ethical Approvals (Research Chapters 2, 3 and 4) 
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 Appendix II 
 
II. b. Ethical Approval (Chapter 2 and 3) 
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Appendix II 
 
II. c. Ethical Approval (Chapter 4) 
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II. d. Ethical Approval (Chapter 4) 
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Appendix II 
 
II. e. Ethical Approval (Chapter 5) 
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Appendix II 
 
II.f. Ethical Approval (Chapter 5) 
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Appendix III: Kit Instructions 
III. a. Kit Instructions for Wantai HEV IgG ELISA 
(The content of this appendix is based on the instructions for use of the commercial ELISA 
(270)) 
 
Principle  
Wantai HEV IgG ELISA is an indirect method for detection of HEV IgG antibodies. 
Microwell strips are pre-coated with HEV recombinant protein. The kit uses a recombinant 
protein (PE2) containing 211 amino acids of ORF-2 derived from a Chinese isolate of 
HEV-1 (223, 224). HEV IgG in sample if present binds to the pre-coated HEV antigen. 
Unbound serum proteins are removed during washing. Rabbit anti-human IgG antibodies 
conjugated to horseradish peroxidase (HRP-conjugate) binds to the bound HEV IgG 
antibody if present. Unbound conjugate is removed after washing. Chromogen A (urea 
peroxide) and B (tetramethylbenzidine) are hydrolysed by bound HRP conjugate, changing 
colour to blue. The reaction is stopped by sulphuric acid and changes colour from blue to 
yellow. Colour intensity is measured with spectrophotometer. Samples negative for HEV 
IgG do not change colour and remains colourless 
 
Procedure 
1. All the reagents are brought to room temperature (18-300C). 
2. Three wells are marked as negative control, two wells as positive controls and one 
as blank. 
3. Specimen diluent (100 µl) is added each well except the blank. 
4. Positive controls, negative controls and samples (10 µl) are added to respective 
wells. 
5. ELISA plate is incubated for 30 minutes at 370C. 
6. Each well is washed 5 times with wash buffer (diluted phosphate buffer saline with 
deionised water - 1:20). Microwells are soaked for 30-60 seconds in between 
subsequent washing. 
7. The wells are blotted dry by tapping on paper towel. 
8. HRP- conjugate is added to all the wells except the blank. 
9. Each well is washed 5 times with wash buffer. Microwells are soaked for 30-60 
seconds in between subsequent washing. 
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10. Chromogen A (50 µl) and chromogen B (50 µl) are added into each well included 
blank. 
11. The plate is incubated at 370C for 15 minutes in dark. 
12. Stop solution (50 µl) is added in each well including the blank. 
13. Absorbance (A) is measured at 450nm within 10 minutes of adding stop solution. 
 
Calculation and Quality Control (Assay Validation) 
Calculation of the cut-off value (C.O) = Nc+ 0.16 
Nc= mean absorbance value for negative controls after subtracting blank. 
If mean absorbance value of the negative controls is lower than 0.03, NC is taken as 0.03 
 
Quality Control (Assay Validation)  
Absorbance value of the blank well is < 0.08 at 450 nm. 
Absorbance values of the positive control is ≥ 0.8 at 450 nm after blanking. 
Absorbance values of the Negative control is ≤ 0.1 at 450 nm after blanking. 
If negative control absorbance values do not meet the quality control criteria, it is 
discarded, and the mean value is calculated by using the remaining two values.  
If more than one Negative control absorbance values do not meet the quality control range 
specifications, the test is invalid and repeated. 
 
Interpretations of the test results 
Negative results (A/C.O < 1): Specimens giving absorbance value less than the cut-off 
value are negative. 
Positive results (A/C.O ≥ 1): Specimens giving absorbance value equal or greater than the 
cut-off value are considered initially reactive. 
Borderline (A/C.O. = 0.9 -1.1): Specimens with absorbance value to cut-off ratio between 
0.9 and 1.1 are considered borderline) 
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Appendix III 
 
III. b. Kit Instructions for Wantai HEV IgM 
(The content of this appendix is based on the instruction for use of the commercial ELISA  
 (271)) 
 
Principle  
Wantai HEV IgM ELISA is an indirect method for detection of HEV IgM antibodies. 
Microwell strips are pre-coated with HEV recombinant protein derived from ORF2 (269). 
HEV IgM in sample if present binds to the pre-coated HEV antigen. Unbound serum 
proteins are removed during washing. Rabbit anti-human IgM antibodies conjugated to 
horseradish peroxidase (HRP-conjugate) binds to the bound HEV IgM antibody if present 
in sample. Unbound conjugate is removed after washing. Chromogen A (urea peroxide) 
and B (tetramethylbenzidine) are hydrolysed by bound HRP conjugate, changing colour to 
blue. The reaction is stopped by sulphuric acid and changes colour from blue to yellow. 
Colour intensity is measured with spectrophotometer. Samples negative for HEV IgM do 
not change colour and remains colourless. 
 
Procedure 
1. All the reagents are brought to room temperature (18-300C). 
2. Three wells are marked as negative control, two wells as positive controls and one 
as blank. 
3. Specimen diluent (100 µl) is added to each well except the blank. 
4. Positive controls, negative controls and samples (10 µl) are added to respective 
wells. 
5. ELISA plate is incubated for 30 minutes at 370C. 
6. Each well is washed 5 times with wash buffer (diluted phosphate buffer saline - 
1:20). Microwells are soaked for 30-60 seconds in between subsequent washing. 
7. The wells are blotted dry by tapping on paper towel. 
8. HRP-conjugate is added to all the wells except the blank. 
9. Each well is washed 5 times with wash buffer. Microwells are soaked for 30-60 
seconds in between subsequent washing. 
10. Chromogen A (50 µl) and chromogen B (50 µl) are added into each well included 
blank. 
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11. The plate is incubated at 370C for 15 minutes in dark. 
12. Stop solution (50µl) is added in each well including the blank. 
13. Absorbance (A) is measured at 450nm within 10 minutes of adding stop solution. 
 
Calculation and Quality Control (Assay Validation) 
Calculation of the cut-off value (C.O) = Nc+ 0.16 
Nc= mean absorbance value for negative controls after subtracting blank. 
If mean absorbance value of the negative controls is lower than 0.03, NC is taken as 0.03 
 
Quality Control (Assay Validation)  
Absorbance value of the blank well is < 0.08 at 450 nm. 
Absorbance values of the positive control is ≥ 0.80 at 450 nm after blanking. 
Absorbance values of the Negative control is ≤ 0.10 at 450 nm after blanking. 
 
If negative control absorbance values do not meet the quality control criteria, it is 
discarded, and the mean value is calculated by using the remaining two values.  
If more than one Negative control absorbance values do not meet the quality control range 
specifications, the test is invalid and repeated. 
 
Interpretations of the test results 
Negative results (A/C.O < 1): Specimens giving absorbance value less than the cut-off 
value are negative. 
Positive results (A/C.O ≥ 1): Specimens giving absorbance value equal or greater than the 
cut-off value are considered initially reactive. 
Borderline (A/C.O = 0.9 -1.1): Specimens with absorbance value to cut-off ratio between 
0.9 and 1.1 are considered borderline) 
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Appendix III 
 
III. c. Kit Instructions for Wantai HEV- Ag ELISA Plus  
(The content of this appendix is based on the instructions for use of the commercial ELISA 
(268)) 
 
Principle 
Wantai HEV-Ag ELISA is a “sandwich’ ELISA in which microwell strips are pre-coated with 
anti-HEV antibodies against HEV antigen (Ag). In the presence of HEV antigen in sample, 
pre-coated antibodies binds to the viral antigen during the incubation step. Washing 
removes unbound sample proteins. Anti-HEV antibody conjugated to the enzyme 
horseradish peroxidase (HRP) binds to anti-HEV HEV Ag complexes on the wells during 
second incubation if the antigen is present in sample. Unbound HRP conjugate is removed 
during washing. Chromogen A (urea peroxide) and chromogen B (tetramethylbenzidine) 
added to the wells are hydrolysed by the bound HRP-conjugate to give a blue-coloured 
product. Stop solution (sulphuric acid) changes colour from blue to yellow. Colour intensity 
is measured with spectrophotometer. Samples negative for HEV Ag do not change colour 
and remains colourless. 
 
Procedure 
1. All the reagents are brought to room temperature (18-300C). 
2. Three wells are marked as negative control, two wells as positive controls and one 
as blank. 
3. Specimen diluent (20 µl) is added each well except the blank. 
4. Positive controls, negative controls and samples (50 µl) are added to respective 
wells. 
5. ELISA plate is incubated for 60 minutes at 370C. 
6. HRP conjugate is added to all the wells except the blank. 
7. Each well is washed 5 times with wash buffer (diluted phosphate buffer saline - 
1:20). Microwells are soaked for 30-60 seconds in between subsequent washing. 
8. Chromogen A (50 µl) and chromogen B (50 µl) are added into each well included 
blank. 
9. The plate is incubated at 370C for 15 minutes in dark. 
10. Stop solution (50 µl) is added in each well including the blank. 
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11. Absorbance (A) is measured at 450nm within 10 minutes of adding stop solution. 
Calculation and Quality Control (Assay Validation) 
Calculation of the cut-off value (C.O) = Nc+ 0.16 
Nc= mean absorbance value for negative controls after subtracting blank. 
If mean absorbance value of the negative controls is lower than 0.03, NC is taken as 0.03 
Absorbance value of the blank well is < 0.08 at 450 nm. 
Absorbance values of the positive control is ≥ 0.8 at 450 nm after blanking. 
Absorbance values of the Negative control is ≤ 0.1 at 450 nm after blanking. 
If negative control absorbance values do not meet the quality control criteria, it is 
discarded, and the mean value is calculated by using the remaining two values.  
If more than one Negative control absorbance values do not meet the quality control range 
specifications, the test is invalid and repeated. 
 
Interpretations of the test results 
Negative results (A/C.O < 1): Specimens giving absorbance value less than the cut-off 
value are negative. 
Positive results (A/C.O ≥ 1): Specimens giving absorbance value equal or greater than the 
cut-off value are considered initially reactive. 
Borderline (A/C.O. = 0.9 -1.1): Specimens with absorbance value to cut-off ratio between 
0.9 and 1.1 are considered borderline). 
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Appendix III 
 
III. d. Kit Instructions for Procleix HEV Assay 
(The content of this appendix is based on the instructions for use of the assay (314)) 
 
The Procleix HEV Assay is a qualitative nucleic acid assay used with an automatic 
Panther system for the detection of HEV RNA in plasma and serum specimens, tested 
individually or in pools. 
 
Principle  
The assay involves three steps in a single tube called multi-tube units (MTUs): 
 
Target Capture 
HEV RNA is isolated from specimens with the use of target capture in MTUs. Specimen is 
treated with a detergent to denature proteins and release viral genomic RNA. Capture 
oligonucleotides that are homologous to highly conserved regions of HEV are hybridised to 
the HEV RNA target, if present in the test specimen. The hybridised target is captured onto 
magnetic micro particles that are separated from the specimen in a magnetic field. 
Washing removes extraneous components from the reaction tube. Oil is added to the tube 
to prevent evaporation of the bound sample. 
 
Target Amplification 
The amplification utilises two enzymes, Moloney murine leukemia virus reverse 
transcriptase and T7 RNA polymerase. The reverse transcriptase generates a DNA copy 
(containing a promoter sequence for T7 RNA polymerase) of the target RNA sequence. 
RNAse H degrades original RNA strand. The T7 RNA polymerase produces multiple 
copies of RNA amplicon from the DNA copy template. 
 
Detection (Hybridization Protection Assay) 
The process utilises DNA probe labelled with Acridinium Ester (AE) that hybridize 
specifically with amplicon. Selection reagent hydrolyses between hybridized and 
unhybridized probe by inactivating the label on unhybridised probes. Detection of the 
hybridized probe is done by chemiluminescence using autodetect fluid 1 and 2 added to 
MTU. Internal conrol is added to each reaction tube with the working target capture 
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reagent. The IC in target capture serves as a control for specimen processing, 
amplification and detection steps. Signal of IC is discriminated from HEV signal by the 
differential kinetics. Dual Kinetic assay technology allows detection of flasher (quick 
luminescence) and glower (slow luminescence) probes. Flasher signal is emitted by IC 
specific amplicon and glower signal by HEV specific amplicon. The chemiluminescent 
signal produced by the hybridized probe is measured by a luminometer and is reported as 
Relative Lights Units (RLU). 
 
Deactivation 
Sodium hyphochloride and buffer is used for deactivation of residual infectious material 
and newly formed amplicon. After 15 minutes, liquid aspirated from MTU and empty tubes 
are discarded. 
 
Procedure 
1. A new or specific set of reagents of HEV Procleix assay are used with the Panther 
system. 
2. Target capture, amplification, enzyme, probe and selection reagents are incubated 
in reagent preparation incubator at 320C for 1 hour. 
3. IC is added to target capture reagent to prepare working target capture reagent. 
4. Working target capture is loaded in target capture carousel. 
5. Amplification, enzyme, probe and selection reagents are loaded in the reagent bay. 
6. System fluids (wash solution, auto detect 1 and 2, buffer for deactivation and oil) 
and Sodium hypochloride are loaded in universal fluids bay. 
7. Consumables such as MTUs, disposable tips, cleaning solution and other 
disposable supplies (waste bag, cover) are loaded in respective bays. 
8. Positive and negative calibrators are loaded in separate tubes with samples in the 
carousel. 
9. Testing is performed in fully closed system with operator commands from the 
monitor. 
10. 244 samples are tested with a set of reagents. 
11. First result is obtained after 3.5 hours and every five minutes five additional results 
are obtained. 
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Procleix HEV Assay Results 
 
Acceptance criteria 
Analyte > 0 and < 40,000 RLU 
IC > 75,000 and < 400,000 RLU 
HEV Positive Calibrator  
Analyte > 400,000 and < 3,000,000 RLU 
IC < 75,000 RLU 
 
Procleix HEV assay cut-off calculations 
Analyte Cutoff = NC Analyte Mean RLU + [0.03 x (PC Analyte Mean RLU)] 
IC Cutoff = 0.5 x (Negative Calibrator IC Mean RLU) 
 
Procleix HEV assay specimen acceptable ranges and interpretation 
 
Specimen interpretation Criteria for the Procleix HEV assay 
Non reactive Analyte S/CO < 1 
and IC > IC Cutoff 
and IC < 750,000 RLU 
Reactive Analyte S/CO > 1 
and Analyte < 5,100,000 RLU 
and IC < 750,000 RLU 
Invalid IC > 750,000 RLU 
or 
Analyte S/Co < 1 
and  
IC < IC Cutoff 
 
Limit of Detection of Procleix HEV assay is 7.9 IU/ml (189). 
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Appendix III 
 
III. e. Instructions for QIAamp Viral RNA Mini kit 
(The content of this appendix is based on the instructions for use of the commercial kit 
(315)) 
 
Principle 
QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kits is a viral RNA extraction kit. The kit uses selective binding 
properties of a silica based membrane with the speed of microspin. The sample is lysed 
under denaturing conditions to inactivate RNases for the isolation of intact viral RNA. 
Buffering conditions provide optimum binding of the RNA to the QIAamp membrane. The 
RNA of virus if present in sample binds to the membrane and contaminants are washed 
away with buffers. RNA is eluted in RNase-free buffer. Purified RNA is free of protein, 
nucleases, and other contaminants. 
 
Preparation of reagents 
Buffer AVE (310µl) is added to the tube containing 310 µg lyophilized carrier RNA to 
obtain a solution of 1 µg/µl. 
Volume of buffer AVL-carrier RNA required is calculated as follows: 
n x 0.56 ml = y ml 
y ml x 10 µl/ml = z µl 
where: n = number of samples to be processed simultaneously 
y = calculated volume of Buffer AVL 
z = volume of carrier RNA-Buffer AVE to add to Buffer AVL 
Buffer AW1 is prepared with ethanol (96-100%) as follows: 
Number of 
preparations 
AW1 concentrate Ethanol Final Volume 
50 19 ml 25 ml 44 ml 
 
Buffer AW2 is prepared with ethanol (96-100%) as follows: 
Number of 
preparations 
AW2 concentrate Ethanol Final Volume 
50 13 ml 30 ml 43 ml 
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Procedure 
1. Prepared buffer AVL containing carrier RNA (560 µl) is pipetted into a 1.5 ml 
microcentrifuge tube. 
2. Plasma/serum sample (140 µl) is added the buffer AVL-carrier RNA in the 
microcentrifuge tube. 
3. The mixture is vortexed for 15 seconds and incubated at room temperature (15-
200C) for 10 minutes. 
4. The tube is centrifuged briefly. 
5. Ethanol (96-100%, 560 µl) is added to the sample, and mixed by vortexing for 15 
seconds and then centrifuged briefly. 
6. Above solution (ethanol with sample) is added to the QIAamp Mini column in a 
collection tube (630 µl). The column is spun at 6000g for 1 min. QIAamp Mini 
column is placed into a clean 2 ml collection tube and tube containing filtrate is 
discarded. 
7. Step 6 is repeated until remaining lysate has been loaded onto the spin column. 
8. Buffer AW1 (500 µl) is added to the QIAamp Mini column and centrifuged at 6000g 
for 1 minute. The column is placed in a clean 2 ml collection tube and tube 
containing filtrate is discarded. 
9. Buffer AW2 (500 µl) is added to the QIAamp Mini column. The column is spun at 
20000g for 3 minutes. 
10. The column is placed in a new 2 ml collection tube and the old collection tube with 
filtrate discarded. The column is centrifuged at 20000g for 1 minute. 
11. QIAamp Mini column is placed in a clean 1.5 ml microcentrifuge tube. The used 
collection tube with filtrate is discarded. Buffer AVE (40 µl) is added to the column, 
incubated at room temperature for 1 minute and centrifuged at 6000g for 1 minute. 
12. Additional buffer AVE (40 µl) is added to the column, incubated and eluted into the 
microcentrifuge tube. 
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Appendix III 
 
III. f. Kit Instructions RealStar® HEV RT-PCR Kit 1.0  
(The content of this appendix is based on the instructions for use of the assay (241)) 
 
Principle 
The RealStar® HEV RT-PCR Kit 1.0 is a qualitative test for the detection of hepatitis E 
virus specific RNA, based on real-time PCR technology. The test utilises reverse-
transcriptase (RT) reaction that converts RNA to cDNA and amplifies specific target 
sequences and target specific probes for the detection of the amplified DNA. The probes 
are labelled with fluorescent reporter and quencher dyes. Probes specific for HEV RNA 
are labelled with the fluorophore FAM. The probe specific for the target of the IC is labelled 
with the fluorophore JOE. Probes with distinguishable dyes enable parallel detection of 
HEV specific RNA and IC in the corresponding detector channels of the real-time PCR 
instrument. 
 
The kit consists of two master reagents (master A and master B) which contains all 
components (buffer, enzymes, primers and probes) to allow reverse transcription, PCR 
mediated amplification and target detection (HEV and internal control). 
The test consists of three processes in a single tube assay: 
 Reverse transcription of target RNA to cDNA 
 PCR amplification of target cDNA and internal control 
 Simultaneous detection of PCR amplicons by fluorescent dye labelled probes 
 
Procedure 
 Extracted HEV RNA from plasma sample and reagents are thawed, mixed and 
centrifuged prior to use. 
 The kit contains IC which is used either as RT-PCR inhibition control or as a control 
of the sample preparation procedure (nucleic acid extraction) and as a RT-PCR 
inhibition control. 
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IC used as a RT-PCR inhibition control 
Number of reactions 1 12 
Master A 5 µl 60 µl 
Master B 20 µl 240 µl 
Internal Control 2.5 µl 30 µl 
Volume Master Mix 27.5 µl 330 µl 
 
IC used as a control for the sample preparation procedure and as a RT-PCR inhibition 
control, IC is added during nucleic acid extraction procedure (10% of elution volume) 
Number of reactions 1 12 
Master A 5 µl 60 µl 
Master B 20 µl 240 µl 
Volume Master Mix 25 µl 300 µl 
 
Reaction setup 
 Master mix (25 µl) is pipetted into each optical reaction tube. 
 Eluate sample from the nucleic acid extraction (25 µl), positive control (25 µl), 
negative control (25 µl) are added in respective reaction tubes with master mix. 
 Samples and controls are mixed with the master mix. 
 Reaction tubes with lids are set up in the thermal cycler. 
 
Temperature profile and dye acquisition 
 Stage Cycle Repeats Acquisition Temperature Time 
Reverse 
transcription Hold 1 - 50
0C 10:00 min 
Denaturation Hold 1 - 950C 10:00 min 
Amplification Cycling 45 
- 950C 0:15 min 
 550C 0:45 min 
- 720C 0:15 min 
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Interpretation of results 
Sample FAM 
Detection 
Channel 
JOE 
Detection 
Channel 
Result Interpretation 
A Positive Positive HEV specific RNA detected 
B Negative Positive HEV specific RNA not detected. 
Sample does not contain detectable 
amounts of HEV specific RNA. 
C Negative Negative RT-PCR inhibition or reagent failure. 
Repeat testing from original sample. 
 
Limit of detection of the kit for pool screening is 4.7 IU/ml (95% CI 3.6-7.6) (240). 
Limit of detection of the kit for individual sample screening is 37.8 IU/ml (95% CI 22.2-
671.2) (240). Analytical sensitivity as per the kit is 0.31 IU/μl (95% confidence interval: 
0.20 - 0.74 IU/μl) (241). 
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Appendix IV: Serological Analysis 
 
IV.a. Serological Analysis (Chapter 2) 
 
 
 
Figure IV.a. Mean S/Co of HEV IgG positive samples tested three times 
 
 
 
Figure IV.b. Mean S/Co of HEV IgM positive samples tested three times 
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Appendix IV 
 
IV.c. Serological Analysis (Chapter 3) 
  
 
 
 
Figure IV.c. Mean S/Co of HEV Ag positive samples tested three times 
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Appendix V: Sample Breakdown and Results (Chapter 3) 
Table V. a: Sample breakdown from each of the following processing centres 
 
Processing 
centre 
Total units of 
whole blood 
collection* 
Sample number 
required 
Actual number of sample 
collected and tested 
BPC 248,448 2754 3,000 
MPC 480,393 5325 5,499 
SPC 430,490 4772 5,000 
PPC 103,706 1150 1,300 
Total 1,263,037 14000 14,799 
BPC: Brisbane Processing Centre, MPC: Melbourne Processing Centre, SPC: Sydney 
Processing Centre, PPC: Perth Processing Centre 
* 1 January 2013 to 4 August 2014 (Source: Report Centre, The Australian Red Cross 
Blood Service) 
 
Table. V. b. HEV antigen and RNA detection in Australian blood donations 
 
Processing centre Samples 
tested 
HEV Ag 
Positive 
%  
(95% CI) 
HEV 
RNA 
posi
tive 
%  
(95% CI) 
Brisbane Processing 
Centre 
3,000 13 0.43  
(0.2-0.67) - - 
Melbourne Processing 
Centre 
5,499 14 0.25 
 (0.12-0.39) 1 
0.0182 
(0.0005-0.1013) 
Perth Processing 
Centre 
1,300 2 0.15  
(0.00-0.43) - - 
Sydney Processing 
Centre 
5,000 23 0.46 
 (0.27-0.65) - - 
Total tested 14,799 52 0.35  
(0.26-0.45) 1 
0.0068 
(0.0002 -.0376) 
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Appendix VI: HEV Quantification and Sequencing (Chapter 3) 
VI. a. Viral load measurement of HEV RNA positive sample 
 
Quantitation Information 
Threshold 0.0108 
Left Threshold 1.000 
Standard Curve Imported No 
Standard Curve (1) conc= 10^(-0.259*CT + 11.059)
Standard Curve (2) CT = -3.854*log(conc) + 42.624
Reaction efficiency (*) (* = 10^(-1/m) - 1) 0.81738 
M -3.85437 
B 42.62415 
R Value 0.99847 
R^2 Value 0.99694 
Start normalising from cycle 1 
Noise Slope Correction Yes 
No Template Control Threshold % 0 
Reaction Efficiency Threshold Disabled 
Normalisation Method Dynamic Tube Normalisation 
Digital Filter Light 
Sample Page Page 1 
Imported Analysis Settings   
 
Quantitation data for Cycling A.Green 
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Standard Curve 
 
No. Color Name Type Ct Given Conc 
(IU/ml) 
Calc Conc 
(IU/ml) 
1 
 
POSITIVE CONTROL Positive 
Control 
27.89  6,661.9 
2 
 
POSITIVE CONTROL Positive 
Control 
27.73  7,310.5 
3 
 
NEGATIVE CONTROL Positive 
Control 
   
4 
 
NEGATIVE CONTROL Positive 
Control 
   
5 
 
WHO HEV Standard Standard 21.61 250,000.0 283,824.9 
6 
 
WHO HEV Standard Standard 22.11 250,000.0 210,417.6 
7 
 
Standard 1 Standard 25.85 25,000.0 22,490.8 
8 
 
Standard 1 Standard 25.68 25,000.0 24,946.5 
9 
 
Standard 2 Standard 29.24 2,500.0 2,965.5 
10 
 
Standard 2 Standard 29.22 2,500.0 2,997.5 
11 
 
Standard 3 Standard 33.37 250.0 252.4 
12 
 
Standard 3 Standard 33.73 250.0 203.0 
13 
 
Standard 4 Standard  25.0  
14 
 
Standard 4 Standard  25.0  
15 
 
Standard 5 Standard  2.5  
16 
 
Standard 5 Standard  2.5  
17 
 
Positive Sample Unknown 26.32  16,989.6 
18 
 
Positive Sample Unknown 26.66  13,821.8 
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Appendix VI 
 
VI. b. Alignment of nucleotide sequences of HEV RNA postive sample idenfied in 
this study with a genotype 3 strain from swine. 
 Score Expect Identities Gaps Strand 
996 bits(539) 0.0 776/893(87%) 6/893(0%) Plus/Plus 
Query  1     GCAATCTCTATTTCATTCTGGCCACAGACTACTACGACCCCTACATCTGTTGATATGAAC  60 
             |||||||||||||| |||||||| ||||| ||||| ||||||||||| |||||||||||  
Sbjct  5762  GCAATCTCTATTTCTTTCTGGCCTCAGACCACTACCACCCCTACATCCGTTGATATGAAT  5821 
 
Query  61    TCCATTACCTCTACTGATGTTAGGATTTTGGTCCAGCCCGGCATCGCCTCTGAACTTGTT  120 
             || ||||| ||||||||||| |||||||||||||| ||||| || ||||| ||| | ||  
Sbjct  5822  TCTATTACTTCTACTGATGTCAGGATTTTGGTCCAACCCGGTATTGCCTCCGAATTGGTC  5881 
 
Query  121   ATTCCTAGCGAGCGCCTCCATTACCGTAATCAGGGTTGGCGCTCTGTTGAAACATCGGGC  180 
             || || |||||||||||||| || || ||||||||||||||||||||||| || || ||| 
Sbjct  5882  ATCCCCAGCGAGCGCCTCCACTATCGCAATCAGGGTTGGCGCTCTGTTGAGACCTCAGGC  5941 
 
Query  181   GTTGCCGAGGAGGAGGCTACCTCTGGCTTGGTGATGCTCTGTATCCATGGCTCCCCCGTT  240 
             || ||||| |||||||||||||| || ||||| ||||||||||| |||||||| || ||  
Sbjct  5942  GTGGCCGAAGAGGAGGCTACCTCCGGTTTGGTAATGCTCTGTATTCATGGCTCTCCTGTC  6001 
 
Query  241   AATTCTTACACTAATACCCCTTATACTGGGGCGTTGGGGCTTCTTGACTTTGCATTGGAA  300 
             |||||||| || |||||||| |||||||||||| | ||||| |||||||||||| | ||| 
Sbjct  6002  AATTCTTATACCAATACCCCCTATACTGGGGCGCTTGGGCTCCTTGACTTTGCACTAGAA  6061 
 
Query  301   CTTGAGTTTAGGAATTTGACACCTGGGAACACTAACACCCGTGTATCCCGGTATACAAGT  360 
             ||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||| || || || |||||||| |||||  
Sbjct  6062  CTTGAGTTTAGGAATTTGACACCCGGGAACACTAATACTCGCGTGTCCCGGTACACAAGC  6121 
 
Query  361   ACAGCCCGTCACCGGCTGCGCCGCGGGGCCGATGGTACTGCTGAGCTTACCACCACGGCG  420 
             |||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||| 
Sbjct  6122  ACAGCCCGTCACCGGCTGCGCCGCGGCGCCGATGGTACTGCTGAACTTACCACCACGGCG  6181 
 
Query  421   GCCACGCGCTTCATGAAGGACTTGCATTTCACCGGCACGAATGGCGTCGGTGAGGTGGGT  480 
             ||||| || ||||||||||| || ||||| || || |||||||| ||||||||||| ||  
Sbjct  6182  GCCACACGGTTCATGAAGGATTTACATTTTACTGGTACGAATGGGGTCGGTGAGGTCGGC  6241 
 
Query  481   CGTGGCATTGCTCTGACATTGTTTAACCTTGCTGACACACTCCTTGGCGGTCTGCCGACA  540 
             ||||| |||||||||||||||||||| |||||||| || || ||||| ||| |||||||| 
Sbjct  6242  CGTGGTATTGCTCTGACATTGTTTAATCTTGCTGATACGCTTCTTGGTGGTTTGCCGACA  6301 
 
Query  541   GAATTGATTTCGTCGGCTATAAGAGAC-A-GGTTCTACTCCCGCCCTGTCGTCTCAGCCA  598 
             ||||||||||||||||||    | | | |   || ||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
Sbjct  6302  GAATTGATTTCGTCGGCT--GGGGGTCAACTATTTTACTCCCGCCCTGTCGTCTCAGCCA  6359 
 
Query  599   ATGGCGAGCCGACTGTCAAGTTATATACATCTGTTGAGAATGCGCAGCAAGATAAGGGGA  658 
             |||||||||||||||| || ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||| || | 
Sbjct  6360  ATGGCGAGCCGACTGTTAAATTATATACATCTGTTGAGAATGCGCAGCAGGATAAAGGTA  6419 
 
Query  659   TTGTTATCCCGCATGATATAGACCCTGTCTC-TTATAGTATTGTCATCCAGGACTATGAC  717 
             |||  ||||||||||| ||||||| ||  |  || | || | ||||||||||| |||||  
Sbjct  6420  TTGCCATCCCGCATGACATAGACC-TGGGTGATTCTCGTGTGGTCATCCAGGATTATGAT  6478 
 
Query  718   AACCAGCATGAGCAGGATCGGCCTACTCCATCGCCCGCCCCCTCACGCCCCTTTTCTGTC  777 
             || || |||||||||||||||||||| || ||||||||||| |||||||| ||||||||| 
Sbjct  6479  AATCAACATGAGCAGGATCGGCCTACCCCTTCGCCCGCCCCATCACGCCCATTTTCTGTC  6538 
 
Query  778   CTTCGTGCTAATGATGTTTTGTGGCTTTCTCTAACTGCCGCTGAGTATGACCAGACCACA  837 
             || |||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| || || |||||||| || ||||| ||| 
Sbjct  6539  CTCCGTGCTAACGATGTTTTGTGGCTTTCTCTTACCGCTGCTGAGTACGATCAGACTACA  6598 
 
Query  838   TATGGGTCGTCAACCAACCCAATGTATGTTTCAGACACTGTTACACTTGTTAA  890 
             ||||||||||| |||||||| |||||||| || |||||||| ||| ||||||| 
Sbjct  6599  TATGGGTCGTCCACCAACCCGATGTATGTCTCGGACACTGTAACATTTGTTAA  6651 
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VII. a. Participant Information Sheet (Chapter 5) 
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Appendix VII 
 
VII. b. Questionnaire (Chapter 5) 
 
